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Abstract 
 This research focused on the detrimental effects of climate change on indigenous 
peoples in Latin America. Indigenous peoples throughout the region tend to live 
subsistence livelihoods, which tie them closely to their land and the surrounding 
environment. This close relationship often means that indigenous peoples acutely 
experience the effects of climate change and are more susceptible to its negative 
outcomes than other populations. Further, indigenous peoples in the region lack the 
mitigation and adaptation capacities to deal with damaging climatic effects. 
 This research was designed to view the impacts of climate change on indigenous 
peoples through a human rights framework, focusing on the difficulties of resource 
allocation and management due to climatic shifts. Methods of critique were applied to 
international responses to climate issues. The research clearly shows the enhanced ways 
in which indigenous peoples are affected by climate change and that their circumstances 
inform their thoughts on both the problem and possible solutions. These perspectives are 
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GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK 
1. Climate Change and Human Rights 
 In today’s increasingly connected and globalized society, humans on both an 
individual and collective level are influenced not just by their close family, friends and 
neighbors, but by a growing number of actors around the globe. At its best, this 
progressive global connectedness has produced fruitful collaborations in many realms of 
our existence and has created positive growth of understanding in both social and 
spiritual spheres. Yet, at its worst, the unprecedented growth in technology, 
communication and mobility have been used by governments, militaries and transnational 
corporations to increase their influence and consolidate power over much of the world’s 
resources and wealth. This has resulted in a global marginalization of billions of the 
world’s poorest citizens who are disproportionally alienated from both economic and 
political opportunities, and suffer from social and cultural losses.  
 It is in this context that the body of international human rights protections is 
growing and changing at a rapid rate. Since the international human rights regime began 
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to take form shortly after the events of World War II, the regime has adapted to an ever-
changing set of global circumstances. In the last six decades the protection of human 
rights has continually expanded, branching out to include a greater number of issues and 
the regime has strived to universally protect human rights for every person. As the world 
has changed, so too have the concepts that define human rights protections. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) has served to protect both civil and 
political rights, or first generation rights, and political, social and cultural rights, or 
second generation rights. Additionally, the rights of historically marginalized peoples 
have also been recognized. These groups include women, children, the disabled and 
indigenous peoples. Most importantly, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries we have 
seen the expansion of what are referred to as third generation rights. These types of 
rights, such as collective rights, natural resources rights or environmental rights, advocate 
for more than just the assurance that actors will not infringe upon human rights, but that 
in their actions they will provide the opportunities to ensure that the cultivation of those 
rights is possible (Westra, 2008, 3). 
 In this ever-changing context, the conception of international human rights has 
had to confront the negative impacts of global climate change. Climate change has been 
well documented by both international and local institutions, especially in the last decade, 
where much of the uncertainly about the causes of the phenomenon and its effects have 
been lifted. It is now clear that the planet and its ecosystems are changing and most 
places across the globe are experiencing a warming effect, as well as varying changes in 
precipitation, storm frequency and landscape coverage. It is also clear that much of this 
change is anthropogenic, or caused by human beings. The assessment of human activity 
  3 
since the start of the industrial revolution, mainly centered in western societies, shows 
that there has been a gradual warming around the globe and that this warming has been 
directly caused and exacerbated by a continued increase in the use of fossil fuels and the 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). As these changes have occurred, they have put in 
danger some of the poorest and most marginalized peoples on the planet: and they, by 
extension, have affected water security, food security, agricultural production, economic 
viability, political stability, and social cohesion. These effects have devastating 
consequences for the livelihood abilities of populations already living in poverty.  
 Environmental factors undeniably influence the protection of human rights and 
will be one of the most pressing issues for the human rights community in the coming 
years.  The fact that developed countries emit the vast majority of GHG emissions while 
those most affected by climate change emit a fraction of the total output is an injustice 
and a human rights violation. To further complicate the issue of climate change, the 
scenario that the world finds itself in today has been produced by what can be viewed as 
historical human rights violations. The industrial pollution that has been perpetuated by 
rich and powerful countries and by the transnational industries they have helped to create, 
have benefited from these practices for over a century. The devastating consequences 
they have produced are only now becoming clear. The human rights field now faces new 
challenges and is confronted with new dilemmas; should human rights instruments be 
expanded to address historical rights violations and should those responsible for these 
violations be held accountable, and if so, then how?  Further, the international regime has 
the added challenge of trying to move forward and continue to expand human rights 
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protections to include third generation rights while still remaining relevant at an 
international level among varying groups of actors who expressly violate human rights.  
2. Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples 
 Global climate change, without question, will affect each and every person on our 
planet. Yet some populations, mainly those residing in developed countries or in larger, 
more affluent cities, will be fortunate enough to remain relatively removed from the costs 
of a warming planet. Eventually, without an effective global initiative to slow climate 
change, we will all face unthinkable consequences. But for populations who live in 
developing countries, in poor sections of cities or in rural areas, the climate crisis cannot 
be avoided or ignored. The altering of ecosystems has been a stark reality for decades and 
has only continued to escalate in the twenty-first century. The effects of climate change 
have been particularly acute for indigenous peoples. Across the world, these groups 
reside most often in rural areas, fundamentally relying on traditional means of 
subsistence, cultivating their own food, building their own irrigation systems and 
maintaining local markets. This kind of livelihood makes a healthy environment 
absolutely vital to their survival. Cities and large industrial centers have the advantage of 
being able to adapt to many, if not all, of the negative consequences of climate change. 
But for traditional peoples who live much closer and more connected to the land, 
avoiding the consequences of anthropogenic climate change is far more difficult (Westra, 
2008,7). 
  According to a 2009 report compiled by the United Nations (UN) called The 
State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
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 Indigenous peoples continue to suffer discrimination, marginalization, extreme 
 poverty and conflict. Some are being dispossessed of their traditional lands as 
 their livelihoods are being undermined. Meanwhile, their belief systems, cultures, 
 languages and ways of life continue to be threatened, sometimes even by 
 extinction (DESA, 2009, v). 
 
In addition, many indigenous and traditional peoples have been historically abused by 
both state and private actors, being pushed to the least fertile and most fragile lands 
through economic, political and social exclusion and are among those at greatest risk to 
climatic changes (Macchi, 2008, 4). This analysis illustrates the difficult plight of 
indigenous peoples all over the world and it is with this background that we must 
consider the dire consequences that future livelihood complications could have. Climate 
change represents what could provide the final blow for many fragile and at risk peoples. 
The changes that stem from it could easily be the catalyst for the extinction to which the 
UN refers. 
 The circumstances that climate change is creating for indigenous peoples are 
multifaceted. First and foremost, changes in temperature, precipitation and overall 
weather activity have, in some instances, devastated the agricultural yields of many 
indigenous groups. This has not only been detrimental to their subsistence farming 
practices but also has destroyed important export crop markets that have allowed some 
populations to earn the means to survive in poverty stricken areas. Connected closely to 
the problems of food security, water security is also a major issue and is created by some 
of the same climate change trends. Indigenous communities are struggling to maintain 
drinking water, to irrigate their crops and to have on consistent yearly precipitation 
patterns that have traditionally allowed them to follow set planting and harvesting cycles. 
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In some areas of the world, gradual rising temperatures over the last several decades have 
contributed to glacial melting, which has affected valuable traditional water resources. In 
other areas, temperature changes have spurred on desertification that has made lands arid 
and unusable, pushing populations from traditional lands and forcing migration. Overall, 
the effects of climate change on natural resource allocation are a crucial contributing 
factor to the struggles of indigenous peoples and their customary ways of life.  
 Collectively, indigenous peoples’ situations are further complicated by their 
inability to adapt to rapid climatic changes. Indigenous populations have historically 
adapted to many things and have excelled for hundreds, even thousands of years at 
changing their routines and lifestyles to adjust to the changing natural world. They have 
developed important strategies within their communities to deal with these changes, yet 
the magnitude of future events that will be brought on by climate change will most likely 
be too large of a shift over too short of a period of time, greatly limiting their capacity to 
adapt accordingly (Macchi, 2008, 5).  
 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
concept of adaptability is “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including 
climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of 
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences” (Macchi, 2008, 15). Indigenous groups 
tend to lack all of these things. They have a tendency to lack the ability to moderate 
potential damages due to a general deficiency of institutional power or technological 
advancement. Communities at the greatest risk also may lack opportunities through state 
or regional actors to further their adaptation power, and tend to lack an overall ability to 
cope with the consequences they experience. All of these shortcomings for indigenous 
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communities stem from their previously mentioned historical marginalization. Their 
vulnerability, as well as their lack of ability to adapt is mainly determined by a low 
degree of social and biophysical security deriving from poverty and the lack of 
entitlements to resources, power and decision-making (Macchi, 2008, 22).  
3. International Frameworks:  Protecting Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples 
and the Environment 
 In light of the tragedies that stemmed from World War II (WWII), the 
international community began to recognize the growing interconnected nature of the 
global system and pursued a path toward the universal protection of all people’s rights. 
This was accomplished through the development of a series of declarations, treaties, 
covenants and conventions that would eventually lead to a modern day human rights 
regime. The most important human rights document that served as the foundation for the 
creation of the international human rights framework was the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). This document, drafted in 1948, fostered the ideas of universal 
rights that were interrelated and could not be separated from one another. From this 
general document came the creation of both the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These two documents have been used throughout the last 
sixty years around the world to fight for the protection of rights and to aid in the 
expansion of the protections that the human rights regime fosters. Together, these 
documents have created sets of norms and values for both private actors and nation states 
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and they have influenced the standards of international discourse, helping to inform 
international law (Westra, 2008, 3).  
 One fundamental principle that the crafters of the UDHR attempted to perpetuate 
through the document was the protection of minorities and other populations at risk of 
discrimination and persecution. It was important, especially after the abuses towards Jews 
and other targeted peoples by the Nazi’s during WWII, to ensure that the most vulnerable 
groups were not only treated with respect, but were protected from abuses by both state 
and individual actors. Protection for vulnerable groups has been specifically addressed in 
a number of successive conventions through the last several decades. These conventions 
include, the Convention of the Eliminations of Discrimination Against Woman 
(CEDAW), the Convention on Rights of the Child, and the Convention on Protections of 
Refugees. More recently the UN drafted and passed the Declaration on Right of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which found its roots in regional and international 
attempts to protect indigenous peoples around the world.  
 According to scholar Alicida Rita Ramos, a brief chronology of the most 
significant events that led to the international recognition of indigenous rights attests to 
the rapidity in which this recognition was attained (Warren, 2002, 252). One of the first 
attempts at international recognition was by the Iroquois Confederacy to the League of 
Nations in the 1920’s. But it was not until the end of WWII and the UDHR that there was 
real recognition of minority rights, which would become known as the forerunner to 
indigenous rights (Warren, 2002, 252). For several decades indigenous peoples struggled 
for their rights within an international framework that often disallowed the consideration 
of them as “minority.” In 1950, a definition of minority was put forth by the Human 
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Rights Sub-commission that stated the term minority applied to non-dominant citizen 
populations with the desire to preserve ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions but were 
also loyal to the state in which they lived (Warren, 2002, 253). This definition worked 
against many indigenous groups who wished to declare their autonomy from the nation 
state and hold self-determined status.  
 It was not until the 1970’s that this same Sub-commission finally recognized the 
differences between indigenous peoples and other minorities. In this light an international 
process began to create a declaration specifically for indigenous rights. In 1989 the first 
and one of the most important official frameworks for the protection of indigenous rights 
came into force. Though there is not one concrete definition of indigenous status within 
international law, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples created a definition and a set of international 
standards that are used regularly to defend indigenous rights in the present day (Warren, 
2002, 5). More recently, the international community, mainly through mechanisms within 
the UN, has continued to further establish the framework for the protection of indigenous 
rights. In 2000 the UN created the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, which has led to a greater participation of indigenous groups and citizens at the 
international level (DESA, 2009, 3). Further, the passing of the UNDRIP has 
significantly improved the international legitimacy of the efforts by indigenous peoples to 
protect themselves through international law. Although almost all member states have 
supported this document, it lacks the backing of both the United States and Canada, 
which significantly undermines its impact.  
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 In considering both broad based human rights and indigenous rights, the 
international community has also been forced to consider protection of the environment. 
Previous to the emergence of climate change science and concern for the environment in 
the 1970’s, much of international legislation involving the environment was either based 
on the protection of valuable market resources or for the protection of nature for beauties 
sake or to preserve a particular threatened species. But in the 1970’s the international 
community began to recognize not only the detrimental effects of human activity on the 
planet’s ecosystems, but also the consequences that this destruction was having on those 
populations living closely tied to the land. Many of these groups were indigenous 
peoples.  
 With concern for these types of issues, the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) was created in 1972 at the Untied Nations Conference on Human 
Environment (UNEP, 2010, http://www.unep.org/). From there, the international 
community has moved forward with a growing awareness of degradation and destruction 
of the environment as well as the effects of climate change and has generated a plethora 
of international laws and mechanisms to address environmental protection (DESA, 2009, 
98). Yet, this growing international framework is poorly equipped to protect the 
environmental rights of indigenous peoples. Bases on the ideas of sovereignty, non-state 
actors such as indigenous groups struggle to assert their own sovereign rights while also 
applying international frameworks to environmental issues that affect them (DESA, 2009, 
98). Though there have been difficulties, indigenous peoples have played a role in the 
international discourse to create environmental protections.  
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 The crux of the argument for indigenous rights to the environment stem from their 
inherent rights as indigenous peoples to their own lands and territories and to access and 
control natural resources within those lands. These rights are protected by the 
aforementioned ILO Convention No. 169, as well as within the UNDRIP. Additionally, 
in 1992, indigenous peoples played a key role in the Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development, or the Earth Summit, and for the first time truly influenced the processes 
used by the international community in relating to the natural environment (DESA, 2009, 
99).  Indigenous peoples’ rights and their unique connection to the environment are also 
recognized by the Convention on Biodiversity, the UN Framework on Climate Change, 
the UN Forest Principles, and the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(DESA, 2009, 101). In sum, indigenous groups have been considered as deserving special 
consideration within international frameworks for protection of the environment and have 
increasingly participated in the creation of these protections. Yet, due to the nature of 
these international frameworks, their rights are still difficult to ensure. In order to 
alleviate these inequities the international community will need to reconsider how it 
views both the self-determination of indigenous groups as well as how it approaches the 
use of natural resources and the environment.  
4. Indigenous Peoples and Collective Rights Concepts 
 There are two key concepts that need to be understood when considering 
indigenous and environmental protections. Those concepts are universalism and cultural 
relativism. Currently, much of the human rights world is divided over the validity of 
these two ideals, many falling somewhere in the middle, defining themselves as having 
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either weak or strong universal or cultural relativist tendencies. Understanding the two 
positions is of major importance within the dialogue of indigenous rights because of the 
importance of collective rights ideas to indigenous belief systems.  
 Briefly, on one side of the human rights debate there are “radical universalists” 
who believe that an individual’s culture is completely irrelevant to the universal validity 
of moral rights and rules (Donnelly, 203, 90). Therefore, ones ethnic group or cultural 
heritage has no bearing on what their human rights are and that these rights are defined 
outside or externally from culture in a universal context. By contrast, “radical cultural 
relativists” believe that culture is the sole source of moral rights and rules, and that 
human rights are only defined by cultures specific internalities (Donnelly, 2003, 89). 
Between these two conflicting worldviews on human rights lie the “weak cultural 
relativists” (also known as a strong universalists), who consider culture to be a secondary 
source of rights and rules but the universality of those rights is the primary factor. And on 
the other side, the “strong cultural relativists” assume that culture is the primary driving 
force of rights and social rules and only in the most extreme cases see some very basic 
rights as totally universal (Donnelly, 2003, 90).  
 These two primary distinctions of the origin of human rights and rules are 
important to the understanding of indigenous rights and their collective nature. For most 
western cultures, human rights are inherently individualistic. And for most westerners 
these individualistic tendencies move them closer to the universalist side of the debate. 
But for many cultures around the world, especially most indigenous groups, the idea of 
individual rights is hard to comprehend within the societal systems that they have 
developed over generations. This leads many indigenous groups and their supporters to 
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call for at least some form of cultural relativism to be considered in the protection of 
human rights.  
 An example of the ways in which indigenous cultures are affected by the 
universal and individualistic beliefs is the struggle for the recognition of collective rights. 
Aside from the right to self-determination, which is extremely important to indigenous 
communities, all of the rights framed within the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR are 
individual in nature. For the most part, international human rights instruments refer to 
only the individual and can be problematic for indigenous peoples when trying to defend 
their rights (Westra, 2008, 39). Although it is understandable to want all human beings to 
have the same rights to a life of dignity, a radical universalist approach fails to consider 
that different cultures have emerged in very different contexts over time. The ways in 
which cultures view the relationship between an individual and others, as well as to 
nature, resources, family and community, are not always the same.  
 According to the UN report, State of the Worlds Indigenous Peoples, in 2009,  
 Indigenous concepts are not confined to human beings but include all living 
 things,  underscoring an essential, unique element of the relationship of 
 indigenous peoples to nature and their natural world that has permeated 
 indigenous identity and is at the core of their world views and perspectives 
 (DESA, 2009, 190).  
 
The concepts that many indigenous cultures have developed to create rights and rules 
within their societies are based on ideas of collective ownership and on the overall 
collectivity of their families and communities. For example, many indigenous 
communities view families as one functioning unit. It would be unimaginable for a child 
to think first of their own well being, but on the contrary they would always place the 
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well being of their family above themselves. In this kind of a situation a collective 
approach to human rights would translate into concepts of community far more 
effectively than individual rights ever could. Additionally, many indigenous communities 
have collective ownership and access to natural resources such as water. Rutgerd Boelens 
has done extensive work in the Andean high country with indigenous groups who have 
total collective ownership over the water rights within their villages. He observes, “water 
polices and intervention practices in the Andean highlands often neglect the cultural 
pluralism inherent to local and indigenous water rights practices, undermining and 
replacing them with externally controlled allocations, organizations and institutions” 
(Boelens, 2008, 127). This completely undermines the indigenous right to choose the 
ways in which they allocate their own resources and illustrates the lack of understanding 
of collective rights by state actors.  
 The narrow view of rights only attaching to the individual is harmful to 
indigenous communities, as well as wholly insufficient in the attempt to protect 
indigenous and collective rights. The collective dimension of indigenous cultures cannot 
be overlooked in human rights discussions and should be considered within the 
frameworks and standards which the international community wishes to set forth (DESA, 
2009, 190). Especially when considering the effects of climate change and environmental 
degradation on indigenous peoples, the concepts that these groups apply to both nature 
and their relationships with one another are paramount to consider. Responsibility to both 
their communities and to future generations, as well as to Mother Earth, help to construct 
their own human rights narratives and need to be considered within the international 
human rights model. The starting point for most human rights instruments has been at the 
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individual level. Yet, Laura Westra correctly points out that simply because indigenous 
rights and collective ideas are their starting point for the discussion of rights and 
responsibilities to the world does not mean that it is somehow wrong, and on the contrary 
may actually point to the error of the individualistic starting point, especially when 
concerning responsibilities towards other comminutes and to the environment  (Westra, 





EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CRISIS ON LATIN 
AMERICA 
1. An Overview of Regional Problems 
 In order to understand the specific effects that climate change and general 
warming trends are having on indigenous populations in Latin America, it is first 
important to have a clear perception of what climatic changes are actually occurring in 
the region and the general effects of these changes. Though climate issues are affecting 
most of the world’s regions, each region has its own ailments, which in turn create 
specific problems for those living in these areas. Generally, there are three trends being 
observed in most of Latin America. 
 First, the region is experiencing temperature increases. Though there have been a 
few cooling trends reported, such as in southern Chile, most of the area is experiencing a 
warming in average annual temperatures. During the last decade a warming of 1 degree 
Celsius has been observed in Mesoamerica and South America, with the exception of 
Brazil where an increase of .5 degrees was seen (Magrin, 2007, 583). Though these 
numbers may seem insignificant, this small amount of warming has created significant 
climatic changes. Second, the region has been impacted by large changes in seasonal and 
annual precipitation. Both increases and decreases have occurred, proving troublesome 
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for different parts of the region. For example increases in rainfall in southeast Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, the Argentinean Pampas and some parts of Bolivia have impacted 
land use and crop yields and have increased flooding, yet a decrease in precipitation has 
been developing in southern Chile, southwest Argentina, southern Peru and western 
Central America (Magrin, 2007, 583). Third, climatic change and precipitation variations 
have been accompanied by extreme weather events throughout the region. These extreme 
weather trends, along with temperature and precipitation changes, have significantly 
impacted life in Latin American.  
  These climate change trends have, by extension, created a plethora of problems 
for peoples living in Latin America. According to the Report of the Second AIACC 
Regional Workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean,  
 “Climate variability and climate change pose risks now and in the future. 
 Resources and activities at risk include human health, food production, water 
 resources, forests, biodiversity, rural livelihoods and coastal populations, 
 infrastructure, fisheries and estuaries” (AIACC, 2004, iii).  
 
Though they will be outlined in greater detail later in this work, the following is a brief 
summary of some of the major effects that have been witnessed in the last several 
decades. Increases in temperatures in the region have had the largest effect on resources 
such as food and water. With temperatures rising, glaciers have been receding, fresh 
water resources have become scarcer and sea levels have been rising. During the last ten 
to twenty years the rate of sea level rise (SLR) has increased from one millimeter per year 
to two to three millimeters per year in southeastern South America. In the future it is 
predicted that adverse affects will be seen in other low-lying areas like El Salvador, 
Guyana and Buenos Aires (Magrin, 2007, 584). Water security has in turn affected food 
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security, contributing to problems with crop irrigation and agricultural production. To 
complicate matters, much of the region of Latin America relies on large amounts of 
hydroelectric power, of which, availability is being affected by reallocation of dwindling 
water resources and has placed power sources at risk.  
 Along with regional temperature increases, rain and snowfall decreases have 
created amplified land cover change and sped up desertification in many areas. Formerly 
fruitful and workable land has now become dry and arid, forcing many people to search 
for better land or livelihood opportunities elsewhere. The land changes that have 
stemmed from climate change are therefore fueling migration and growing refugee 
populations in Latin America. It is predicted that 50% of agricultural land in the region 
will likely be subjected to desertification and salinisation by the 2050’s. On the other 
hand, increases in precipitation in other areas have also had negative effects on land use 
and crop yields and have heightened the risk of intense flooding (Magrin, 2007, 583). 
Agriculture in Latin America is particularly at risk to climate change, which is 
troublesome for two reasons. First, many poor and rural farmers rely on subsistence 
farming to feed their families and second, the agricultural sector of Latin America 
accounts for 10% of the gross domestic product of the region and if damaged many will 
suffer economic hardships (Magrin, 2007, 583).  
 Further, climate change and all of its accompanying trends will affect important 
plant and animal species that provide both sustenance and livelihood opportunities for 
those living in Latin America. Many plants and animals that are already endangered may 
be lost forever due to climatic impacts. The risks for human health and safety are also 
important to acknowledge. In Latin America, many diseases are water and climate-related 
  19 
and can develop more aggressively due to increasingly warm and humid environments. 
These diseases include malaria and dengue, which can be deadly (Magrin, 2007, 583). 
Researchers have also shown concern for some less obvious, but equally detrimental 
secondary effects to populations who are being acutely affected by climate change.  
These effects include an increase in regional violence, a decrease in gender equality and 
an overall negative effect on social cohesion. In short, the effects of climate change 
trends will be felt heavily in the Latin American region and its manifestations have 
already been proven to be greatly varied and highly detrimental, especially to vulnerable 
indigenous groups.  
2. Specific Sub-Regional Conditions 
 It is important to highlight the acute effects that are experienced by indigenous 
peoples due to global climate change, yet also to illustrate the ways in which climate 
change is altering Latin America in specific ways that differentiate it from other places in 
the world. By doing so, one can hope to understand the magnified plight of marginalized 
and poor indigenous groups in the area, appreciating both their unique struggle as Latin 
American indigenous groups, and the common struggles they share with other indigenous 
peoples around the globe. Though the region of Latin America is at times viewed as a 
cohesive unit by those working on climate change issues at the macro level, it is 
important to convey the differences in weather patterns, topography, precipitation and 
temperature increases that the various regions of Latin America experience. Again, with 
these differences in mind, one can understand the specific problems of indigenous 
peoples in varying sub-regions of the area, as well as how they relate to the larger picture 
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of indigenous struggles against climate change in Latin America. The following is a brief 
summary of four sub-regions of Latin America and the climatic impacts that are 
occurring therein. Although not an exhaustive list of the details of climate change in the 
region, it will serve to briefly demonstrate the variations that exist.  
Mexico 
 The very northern most state in Latin America, Mexico has over 100 million 
inhabitants, where more than half are affected by poverty and three-fifths live in urban 
areas (Chandler, 2002, 28). It is a mountainous country that is frequented by hurricanes 
and other tropical disturbances due to its close proximity to both Atlantic and Pacific 
weather patterns and the infamous El Nino currents. The region has historically been 
characterized by an average to above average annual precipitation, with some areas arid 
and others lush. Though there are desert areas, the country has historically been 
characterized by rural farmers who rely on rain fed agriculture to support their families, 
as well as by larger-scale irrigated areas, such as those in Sonora and Sinaloa states, 
known as the bread basket of Mexico, that supplied food to Mexico’s large urban areas 
(Warner, 2009, 7). 
 In the last several decades many of these historical characterizations of Mexico’s 
climate and topography have begun to change. Due to global changes in weather patterns 
brought on by anthropogenic climate change, severe weather occurrences such as tropical 
storms and hurricanes have increased in and around the country. This has had a large 
impact on crop failure, has destroyed homes and has killed thousands of Mexican 
citizens. Along with a heightened occurrence of storm activity, it is predicted that the 
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country’s low-lying coastal areas, particularly around the Gulf Coast and the Caribbean, 
will face sea level rise that will displace coastal inhabitants and destroy ecosystems 
(Warner, 2009, 7).  
 In Mexico, as in most of Latin America, a major concern related to global 
warming is a rise in annual average temperature throughout the country. According to a 
report by the World Bank (WB) that detailed Mexico’s relationship to climate change in 
2009,  
 By 2020 projected temperature increases in the winter (December-February) are 
 between 0 and 2.5 C and in the summer (June – August) are in the range of 0.9 
 and 2.2 C3. It is very probable that by the year 2050 the climate in Mexico will 
 become warmer by 2-4 C especially in the Central and Northern parts of the 
 country (World Bank, 2009c, 2). 
 
These would be very large changes for a nation that is already struggling with poverty, 
food security, water security and other societal shortcomings. A rise in temperature 
would lead to an increase in already high soil evaporation rates, which unless combined 
with substantial increases in precipitation, would result in reduced runoff and soil 
moisture levels (Eakin, 2007, 936). Further, the heightened temperatures will further 
contribute to the desertification of more and more Mexican land, which will harm 
agriculture, force migration toward urban centers and destroy existing ecosystems.  
 Yet the chief concern related to climate change in Mexico is a reduction in 
precipitation. According to the same 2009 WB report,  
 The rainfall will decrease by up to 15% in the Central part and by less than  
 5% in the area of the Golf of Mexico, mainly between January and May; by 2020 
 projected precipitation fluctuations will be in the range of -7 to +12% (December-
 February) and -8 to +12% (June-August) (World Bank, 2009c, 2).  
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These drops in precipitation will acutely affect the country’s runoff that now supplies 
both irrigation and drinking water supplies, and is collected by small farmers for crop 
maintenance. Estimates in the decline range from 5% to 50% over the next several 
decades, with the northern regions of the state suffering most of all (Warner, 2009, 7). 
These changes in water availability will only be exacerbated by socioeconomic situations 
in the country, as well as by the continued rise in temperature already occurring. Mexico, 
due to its unique location and topography, finds itself at major risk for climate related 
problems such as sea level rise, climate related weather hazards and desertification. 
Additionally, it will increasingly suffer from both water and food security problems and 
forced migration as a result of temperature increase and precipitation decrease.  
Central America 
 Central America, situated between Mexico and the greater South American 
region, is made up of seven countries: Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Panama, Honduras and Guatemala. Similar to its Mexican neighbor, the countries that 
make up Central America are prone to extreme weather events, such as tropical storms 
and hurricanes due to their position between both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Yet, 
many areas of Central America are less mountainous than areas in Mexico and 
significantly less arid. Though there are several major urban centers within Central 
America, a large percentage of the population reside in semi-rural or completely rural 
sections of the region and rely on subsistence and export agriculture for livelihood 
assurance. Like Mexico, much of the population lives in poverty, which complicates the 
effects of climate change. 
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 Generally, Central America is suffering from similar climate induced situations as 
in Mexico. The WB has predicted that all of the countries will face both temperature 
increases, as well as precipitation decreases. Though data varies depending on the time of 
year and area of the country, predictions of temperature increases range anywhere from .6 
degrees Celsius in parts of Honduras, to 4.5 degrees Celsius in parts of Guatemala in the 
next several decades. Predictions for precipitation decrease are equally varied and 
pessimistic throughout the region (World Bank, 2009b, 1). Further, finding itself 
surrounded by ocean, Central America is particularly vulnerable to SLR. These rising 
levels acutely influence ecosystems on both the east and west sides of the region and 
threaten to destroy livelihoods and force migrating populations further inward to 
overcrowded urban centers.  
 Yet, for Central America, the most dangerous and devastating change that is being 
facilitated by climate instability is the increased occurrence of violent and deadly natural 
disasters, namely hurricanes and other tropical weather disturbances. Like Mexico, this 
region has been inundated by severe weather that has brought destruction and death to all 
the states. But the damage that these storms cause affect a much larger percentage of the 
Central American land area, making them more devastating for small countries. The 
effects of extreme events due to climate change, such as flooding and droughts, are the 
main manifestations of the extremes and approximately 85% of the disasters in Central 
America are related to them (Fernandez, 2006, 2). And although the overall precipitations 
amounts are dropping in most areas, increased intensity of rainfall during extreme 
weather has served to create a strange dichotomy for populations who suffer from a lack 
of water followed by intensified storms. Further, an increase in the number of storms 
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within a season has hurt communities’ abilities to recover in a timely manner in order to 
be ready for the next weather event.  
The Andes 
 The Andean section of Latin America is one of the most diverse and varied in the 
entire region. Spanning from Colombia, through Ecuador and Peru, and down in to 
Bolivia, the area is characterized by some of the highest mountains in the world, as well 
as low lying coastal and tropical areas. The inhabitants of these countries are as varied as 
the terrain itself and have learned to live at extremely high altitudes, in intense tropical 
temperatures and in larger urban centers that all coexist alongside one another. Like 
Mexico and Central America, the countries in the Andes suffer from poverty, although 
less acutely than in Central America, and experience a large urban-rural divide that 
influences how they are affected by climate change.  
 Like their northern neighbors, the region is experiencing climate change through 
both an increase in average annual temperatures and an unpredictable fluctuation in 
annual precipitation. Temperatures throughout the Andes have increased, and 
temperature increases have been confirmed to be worse at higher elevations, 
compounding the issues of climate change in fragile high altitude ecosystems. By the end 
of the twenty-first century, some models predict that the tropical Andes will experience a 
warming of between 4.5 and 5 degrees, which would severely alter all life in the area 
(Vuille, 2008, 79). Predictions for precipitation in the next few decades reveal an increase 
in precipitation during the so-called “wet season” and a decrease in precipitation in the 
“dry season” (Vuille, 2008, 79). Similar to situations predicted for Central America, this 
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imbalance and unpredictable rain and snowfall will cause major problems for agricultural 
crops and have major livelihood impacts.  
 Yet, potentially the largest climate change variant that the Andean region faces is 
glacial melting. Unique to this region alone, the Andes are greatly threatened by the 
warming that is producing this glacial melt. Glacial runoff has fed aquifers, aided in 
irrigation and provided drinking water for many Andean communities for thousands of 
years. The runoff not only directly helps those living at higher elevations maintain 
livelihoods, but feeds many important water sources throughout the lower altitudes of the 
region. The effects are already being felt by the inhabitants of the area and will continue 
to grow with further warming. The region will see a heightened threat to water access, 
food security, health and subsistence livelihoods throughout. The population of the Andes 
still share many of the same concerns that the rest of Latin America does when it comes 
to temperature and precipitation changes but suffer from unique risks associated with the 
melting of tropical Andean glaciers.  
Brazil and Amazonia 
 Brazil is by far the largest country in all of Latin America. Covering nearly 50% 
of the entire landmass of South America, it shares borders of varying size with every 
South American country except Chile. And although nine countries share parts of the 
Amazon rain forest, or Amazonia, Brazil is best known for its share, constituting over 
60% of the entire area. Brazil has a population of 170 million and exhibits the similar 
urban and rural divide seen throughout Latin America. The state has many of the largest 
and most populated cities in the region, while many tribal peoples, as well as campesina 
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farmers still live primarily off the land. Though the percentage of those living below the 
poverty line is lower in Brazil than in other areas of Latin America, they still have at least 
10% of their citizens living without electricity and 20% living in impoverished conditions 
(Chandler, 2002, 4). These realities, along with its sheer size, complicate the effects of 
global climate change for the country.  
 In Brazil the three general trends that have been seen with each of the other 
aforementioned regions remain true. First, Brazil, like all other Latin American nations, 
will experience temperature increases due to global climate change. Depending on which 
scenario one looks to, either a more optimistic or pessimistic one, changes in annual 
average temperature in Brazil may increase anywhere from 1.4 degrees Celsius to 5.4 
degrees Celsius (World Bank, 2009a, 1). These numbers are projected to be higher in 
dense, humid jungle regions, as well as in areas that have been cleared of forest cover in 
order to make way for cattle and agricultural operations. Secondly, Brazil will face 
changes to its overall precipitation. Yet this matter is one of more debate and 
significantly more complicated due to wide variations in the northern and southern 
portions of the country. In parts of eastern Amazonia, rainfall may decrease anywhere 
from 5-20% compared with present levels, where as in northeastern Brazil, rainfall may 
change anywhere from 10-15%. Conversely, in southern Brazil, as with parts of northern 
Argentina, it is predicted that precipitation levels will increase. This would appear to 
cause a positive outcome on the water supply for crop yields and basin levels, but this 
increase will alternatively increase flooding and crop damage, possibly having disastrous 
effects on both subsistence and larger export agricultural products (Marengo, 2008, 3). 
Third, being partially a coastal region, Brazil is also susceptible to SLR, which is feared 
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will harm vulnerable mangrove ecosystems (World Bank, 2009a, 1). These vast 
differences will undoubtedly complicate actions intended to deal with climate change for 
Brazilian citizens.  
3. The Resource Problem-Climate Impacts on Food and Water Security for 
Indigenous Latin America 
  Rising temperatures, variation in precipitation and increases in severe weather are 
currently manifesting troubling effects on a variety of ecological and natural 
environments throughout Latin America and are uniquely evident in different areas. Yet 
these environmental factors are not the sole concern of inhabitants of the region. Global 
climate change is also having profound impacts on the livelihood capabilities of many 
Latin Americans with indigenous populations among the most severely affected. Climate 
change and its environmental consequences are having vitally harmful effects on two of 
the most fundamental resources to human survival: food and water. Availability, 
acquisition, and maintenance of these two resources have been the building blocks to 
healthy and sustainable livelihoods in indigenous Latin American communities for 
centuries. Through collective systems of agriculture and crop management, water 
collection and irrigation, and hunting and gathering, native societies have maintained 
themselves in many of the same ways their distant ancestors had. These traditions of food 
and water allocation and distribution have been passed down from generation to 
generation and have aided in the success of complex and self-sustaining societies. Yet 
with the complications that have been brought on by climate change, many indigenous 
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societies are being threatened with massive food and water security issues that could 
jeopardize precious resources, livelihoods and possibly entire cultures.  
 Due to all of the various climatic changes that Latin America has seen in the last 
several decades, indigenous peoples have experiences massive food security problems. 
Living closely to the land, often having little contact with the so-called modern world, 
these groups have struggled to maintain agricultural yields, have seen the disappearance 
of valuable game animals and have experienced a reduction in safe and clean fishing 
areas. Many have lost the ability to provide food for themselves and their families or to 
participate in local, regional or international agricultural markets, further complicating 
income and livelihood opportunities. Though indigenous groups vary in the ways they 
struggle with food security, the plight of the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua highlights the 
particular dangers that climate based food security issues have on indigenous peoples in 
the region. 
 Case Study: Food Security and Miskito Indians in Nicaragua 
 The small Central American country of Nicaragua is among the poorest and most 
underdeveloped in Latin American. Astoundingly, according to the World Bank, in 2009 
45.1% of the country’s population was surviving on less than one dollar a day. About 
41% of the population lived in rural communities, including many of the country’s 
85,000 indigenous peoples. Of this rural population, 68% lived in poverty and 30% in 
extreme poverty (World Bank, 2009, 8). In all, the economic and political situation in the 
country is troubling. In the country’s Mosquitia region, home to mainly Miskito Indians 
who are the country’s poorest ethnic group, the situation is at its worst. The area is 
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largely neglected by the Nicaraguan government and international support, lacks proper 
education or health care services, and has no electricity or telephone services (Oxfam, 
2010, 1). There are few roads in or out of the area so supplies are often unavailable and 
evacuation during severe weather is extremely complicated. For the Miskito, climate 
change and food security are added to an unfortunately long list of other pressing 
concerns. 
 Yet Miskito Indians have not always suffered in the serious ways in which they 
are today. For centuries this remote group had fended off the outside world and had 
successfully survived through a subsistence lifestyle, growing their own food, hunting, 
and fishing. “People survive by growing rice and beans, and also by fishing and hunting,” 
explains Brunwell Perez Bell who gave an interview to Oxfam and talked about the 
history of the Miskito and their food supply. “People plant for their own consumption 
here” (Oxfam, 2010, 1). Yet now, after centuries of defending their rainforest territories 
from Spanish settlers, Sandinista Guerrillas, and US-backed Contra forces, the Miskito 
have met an enemy they are not equipped with the knowledge to fight, climate change 
(Kelly, 2007, 2).  
 “All my life the earth has told me when the rains are coming,” said Miskito elder 
Marciano Washington, but now he says he does not understand what is happening to the 
land. According the UK Guardian in 2007, Washington’s seed stock had rotted or been 
eaten by rats and the few rice seeds that had sprouted were only a few inches tall, yellow, 
and discolored (Kelly, 2007, 1). In the past decade or so this has been a common story for 
many Miskito who have experienced devastating environmental effects that have 
threatened their food security and their survival. Rainfall has been changing and 
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landslides and topsoil have eroded, leaving riverbanks bare and flood prone. Heavy 
rainfall during the traditional dry season has wreaked havoc on family crops and the 
majority of communities are now struggling to grow enough food to eat (Oxfam, 1, 
2010). Isolated from modern farming techniques and crippled by discrimination and 
poverty, Miskito Indians now find themselves in a terrible predicament. Facing chronic 
food shortage problems, it seems that this historically strong, proud and self-reliant group 
may have to accept external aid, including modern agricultural and food production 
techniques, from the very outsiders who have driven the anthropogenic climate change 
that threatens their communities. If they do not, they may face a much worse fate, the 
extinction of their people.  
Case Study: The Disappearance of Bolivian Glaciers and Water 
Security 
 As discussed previously, varying precipitation and glacial melting brought on by 
climate change has created water security problems in the region. Water collection for 
both consumption and irrigation is vitally important to successful indigenous livelihoods 
and directly correlates to the ability of these populations to maintain food security. 
Though again, all indigenous communities are suffering in different ways with the 
problems of water security, the case study of water resource allocation and glacial 
melting in the highlands of Bolivia illustrates the indigenous struggle to maintain water 
resources in the region. 
 The South American state of Bolivia is home to approximately 20% of all the 
world’s tropical glaciers, which are located in extremely high altitude locations along the 
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equator (Aguirre, 2010, 1). Worldwide, glaciers provide a much needed water source for 
drinking water, sanitation and irrigation, especially to indigenous peoples who have lived 
near the sources of glacial runoff for generations. For this reason, the startling trend of 
glacial melting caused by global temperature increases has an immense impact on the 
water security of indigenous peoples around the world, and specifically in Bolivia’s 
Cordillera Real mountain range. Glaciers in this region lost 40% of their mass between 
1975 and 2006. Astonishingly, the Chacataya glacier, formerly home to Bolivia’s best 
skiing and a frequent tourist destination, completely disappeared in 2009. The Chacataya 
glacier formerly rested just twenty miles from the Illimani glacier, an important water 
source in the region that may be in similar danger. This glacier, while supplying water to 
both the major urban centers of El Alto and La Paz, also provides a large portion of the 
water supply to the small village of Khapi, which is composed of 48 families, over 90% 
of whom are Aymara Indian (Wagner, 2009, 3). 
 In the Andean region of Bolivia, more than one thousand indigenous communities 
depend on tropical glaciers like Illimani as their primary water source. During the rainy 
season, ice mass is added to glaciers while water slowly runs off the mountains and is 
used by the people living below (Parker, 2010, 1). The resource of water and its 
importance to villages like Khapi cannot be understated. Feeding local rivers and high-
altitude peat bogs, Illimani and other glaciers provide water for consumption, sanitation, 
and irrigation (Wagner, 2009, 2). In short, the ability of indigenous peoples in villages 
like Khapi to nourish themselves rests primarily on the health and vitality of their 
glaciers. This community relies on knowledge that has been passed down from 
generation to generation in order to understand weather patterns and regulate water 
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collection and usage. Yet with rapidly changing weather occurrences these time-tested 
methods are failing. Javier Cortez, a farmer in Khapi, struggles to maintain crop yields 
and detests having to use pesticides and chemicals to keep them alive as has never before 
been necessary (Aguirre, 2010, 1).  
 But overall, the largest concern for all involved is the unreliability of water 
supplies. Without a consistent and reliable source of water like Illimani and the other 
tropical glaciers, indigenous villages in Bolivia may have to forcibly migrate and may 
even be faced with extinction. Unfortunately, climate scientists and glaciologists are not 
optimistic about the future of tropical glaciers in the Andes. According to experts, the 
Illimani glacier has been given a seven to ten year life expectancy if current warming 
trends continue (Parker, 2010, 1). Even more frightening is that some predict if global 
climate change is not significantly mitigated, it is doubtful that any glaciers will exist in 
the high Andean region in just thirty years (Aguirre, 2010, 1). For villages like Khapi this 
means their ability to ensure water security is in enormous jeopardy. But for many people 
at the foot of Illimani, the disappearance of the glaciers is about more than just water. It is 
about the important role in cultural and spiritual life that the glacier plays within their 
indigenous community, many describing the epic retreat of the ice as equivalent to the 
loss of a family member (Aguirre, 2010, 1).  
4. Amazonian Forest Cover- Most Vulnerable and Most Valuable 
  The Amazon rain forest is undoubtedly one of the world’s most important and 
diverse ecosystems. Though it spans an area that includes nine different countries, well 
over half of this massive forest exists within Brazilian borders. The rainforest is a wealth 
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of both plant and animal diversity and is home to some of the most remote indigenous 
tribes in the world. According to present estimates by FUNAI, the federal department 
established to oversee Indian affairs in Brazil, 12.5% of the national territory is controlled 
by indigenous tribes, though they make up just 450,000 citizens, just one fourth of one 
percent of Brazils total population. Further, out of the estimated 580 demarcated Indian 
reserves set aside for indigenous peoples, 65% of them are in the Amazon, creating 
pockets of natural splendor and biodiversity within an otherwise ravaged Brazilian forest 
landscape (Hammer, 2007, 3). For decades the Brazilian Amazon has been subject to 
massive legal and illegal timber operations and to forest clearing for agricultural and 
livestock purposes. Responsible indigenous stewardship of the land has proven one of the 
only successful combatants to this deforestation.  
 Yet climate change is threatening both the indigenous peoples in this region and 
the ecosystem that they call home. Climate change is an obvious threat to indigenous 
tribes in the Amazon region. It has destroyed river basins, caused droughts in rain-soaked 
forest and boosted pest population, all of which have complicated life for forest 
inhabitants (Economist, 2008, 2). The Amazon is predicted to be one of the most affected 
areas on the planet. According to United Nations climate scenarios, warming in South 
America will be worse in the Amazonia region, with some models reaching a 6-8 degree 
Celsius warming trend in the next ninety years (Marengo, 2008, 1). Depending again on 
model optimism or pessimism, rainfall in the eastern Amazon region will reduce 
anywhere from 5-40% (Marengo, 2008, 1). Overall, there will be a high frequency of dry 
spells in eastern Amazonia and intense rainfall in western Amazonia, loss of natural 
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ecosystems and biodiversity, lower river levels, and more favorable conditions for the 
spread of dangerous forest fires (Marengo, 2008, 3). 
  To those indigenous peoples who rely on locally produced food and water 
resources these conditions will be tragic. Tribes living closely to the land in far reaching 
Amazon jungle areas will be acutely affected by these changes and will 
disproportionately feel the effects of climate change in comparison to their contribution 
toward the emissions fueling it. Yet, conversely it appears that these changes may in fact 
present opportunities for indigenous peoples that have not been available in the past. Due 
to the great importance of forests and healthy forest cover to countering emissions and 
climate change, international groups working on climate issues are seeking successful 
forest stewardship models. These groups are more readily looking to indigenous tribes, 
especially within Amazonia, for their input on protecting forests and maintaining them 
sustainably. So although the Amazon and the indigenous peoples who inhabit it are 
among the most vulnerable to climate change they might also provide some of the most 
valuable knowledge to help move toward viable solutions. The following case study of 
the Surui tribe in Brazil illustrates indigenous practices blended with modern technology 
in an attempt to combat climate change, end deforestation and protect the Surui people.  
Case Study: Forest Protection and the Surui Tribe of Brazil 
 The Brazilian Amazon contains some of the most remote and diverse indigenous 
tribal groups in the world. Some isolated groups are still at the present time uncontacted 
by outsiders, while others maintain only minimal contact with loggers, ranchers and in 
some cases, members of the Brazilian government. Yet there are other tribes that have 
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been in contact with outsiders for decades and who are attempting to increase a direct 
dialogue with the globalized world for practical and beneficial purposes. Because groups 
in this area are acutely affected by global climate change and heavily infringed upon by 
illegal logging and other irresponsible forestry practices, some indigenous leaders are 
seeking to create fruitful relationships with outsiders to help protect their land. Tribes 
have sought assistance from both regional and global intergovernmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and even transnational corporations like 
Google, to ensure that these dangers are addressed. Tribal leaders are hopeful that 
seeking support from outsiders will help to ensure survival of their peoples and to 
safeguard their land, resources and cultural identities.  
 Deep in the Amazon rainforest, there are 248,000 hectors of virtually pristine land 
that stand in stark contrast to the dry, dusty and completely deforested landscape that 
surrounds it. The Surui tribe inhabits this large area of forest, lead by their chief Almir 
Narayamoga Surui (Zwick, 2009, 2). Contact was made with this tribe in 1969, at which 
point disease brought by outsiders wiped out most of the tribe’s population and land 
speculators took most of their territory. Later, the government of Brazil eventually 
enacted laws that protected this and other indigenous land but, by this time, nearly all 
economic opportunities had been lost to the Surui and they themselves were reduced to 
deforesting their own land to survive (Zwick, 2009, 2). For the last fifteen years things 
have begun to change for the Surui people with the help and dedication of their leader, 
Almir. The only member of his tribe to attend university and the first to visit the west, 
Almir is attempting to institute a fifty-year plan to save the rainforest and his people, 
receiving powerful support from allies in Brazil and abroad (Hammer, 2007, 1). Single 
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handedly Almir has brought his tribe back from near extinction and has created ties to the 
outside world to ensure for them a viable future.  
 Almir’s fifty-year plan is a development plan for his tribe that includes efforts to 
create a viable economy, provide jobs and education and protect their land from logging 
and other environmental damages. The campaign to improve the situation of the tribe has 
included creating a mapmaking project in which the tribe’s history and traditions, as well 
as the current landscape, will be recorded. It is hoped this will provide training, jobs and 
benefits for the surrounding Surui people (Hammer, 2007, 2). Almir has also sought to 
take advantage of the United Nations Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) plan to earn credits for acting as guardians 
of the rainforest. With the money that would be made through schemes like REDD, 
Almir hopes to be able to finance the activities of his fifty-year plan (Zwick, 2009, 1). 
Additionally, and possibly most ambitiously, Almir has managed to attain a deal with 
global internet giant Google to use their Google Earth technology to track illegal logging 
and mark the habitats of precious plant and bird species (Economist, 2008, 3).  
 Undoubtedly, this will be on uphill battle for Almir and his people. First, they will 
have to keep peace and consensus among themselves in order for the plan to be 
successful. Thus far, Almir has persuaded fourteen of eighteen Surui chiefs to declare a 
moratorium on logging within the reserve. Even though the removal of timber from the 
areas is illegal, some chiefs will allow it, or even support it, as it provides jobs for some 
4,000 inhabitants and is a reliable source of steady income (Hammer, 2007, 2). Further, 
some critics of the UN’s REDD scheme fear that indigenous tribes like the Surui will lose 
out on benefits from the program because the schemes are based on rewarding reduction 
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of deforestation from previous levels. Vasco van Roosmalen, director of the Amazon 
Conservation Team-Brazil states, “REDD should enhance recognition that indigenous 
people have maintained the state of their forests, not penalize them for this stewardship” 
(Butler, 2009, 2). Many fear that the REDD program would not provide the carbon 
payments needed for Almir’s plan to be realized.  
 One thing seems to be certain, indigenous peoples are one of the world’s best 
stewards for saving and maintaining healthy forest spaces that will contribute the curbing 
of global climate change. “If anything offers hope for the survival both of the world’s 
remaining rainforest and its inhabitants, it may be the rich world’s feeling that forest-
dwellers are the most effective stewards both of carbon and biodiversity” (Economist, 
2008, 2). Research has recently shown that indigenous reserves are particularly effective 
at slowing forest clearing in highly deforested areas and that the incidence of dangerous 
fires in reserve areas, magnified by warming temperatures, are half that of those in non-
protected areas (Butler, 2009, 2).  
 Though the health and vitality of many forested areas in Latin American and 
around the globe seem to be directly linked to the stewardship of tribes like the Surui, the 
removal of indigenous peoples from their traditional lands, forested and otherwise, is 
widespread. Perhaps surprisingly, a large portion of this forced removal is being done 
under the constructs of conservation, where well known conservation group like 
Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) support policies that protect 
massive amounts of land area from human use, including that of indigenous peoples. 
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About half the land currently selected for protection is occupied or regularly used by 
indigenous peoples and in the Americas the figure is over 80% (Dowie, 2010, 30).  
 This phenomenon has created what researchers call the “conservation refugee,” 
who are removed from their homelands involuntarily, either by force or through a variety 
of less coercive measures (Dowie, 2010, 30). These removals are not just troubling 
human rights violations but are also problematic for the vitality of the areas they are 
supposedly protecting. Indigenous groups are often an integral part of the ecosystems in 
which they reside, working in balance with other species to control populations, pollinate 
diverse seed and maintain corridors between delicate ecosystems (Dowie, 2005, 35).  By 
taking the human component out of the natural environment, groups of well meaning 
people are violating the rights of indigenous peoples, while also disturbing the balance of 
the ecosystems they aspire to protect. Further, they are removing valuable 
conservationists and eliminating human action that could aid in the preservation of forests 
and other beneficial environments whose existence aid in the fight against global climate 
change. The collaboration among international groups and indigenous peoples like the 
Surui has the potential to impact deforestation, global carbon emissions and climate 
change while also aiding conservation agendas. If fostered, these relationships could 
assist in finding respectful and effective ways of protecting the environment while also 
protecting the livelihoods of those living within it.  
5. Increased Migration, Environmental Refugees and Climate Change 
 As the effects of anthropogenic climate change manifest themselves in the forms 
of temperature increases, precipitation decreases and soil degradation, Latin America has 
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seen an increase in migration and an escalation in environmental refugees. These 
populations often include the poorest and most oppressed citizens, many of whom are 
indigenous. Overall, an increase of movement has been seen in the region when people 
are forced to move from their homes in search of improved livelihoods. At its worst, this 
movement produces environmental refugees. Although not technically given refugee 
status under the UN, the environmental refugee has been increasingly recognized on the 
international level and has gained considerable attention in the last decade. These are 
people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, 
soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and other environmental problems and are 
forced to flee their country (Myers, 2002, 609). Those peoples who are not fleeing their 
native country are often internally displaced for temporary periods or migrate 
permanently within their home country. The frequently quoted figure of 200 million 
environmental displaced peoples by 2050 testifies to the looming importance of this 
phenomenon (Deprez, 2010, 2).  
 The Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report 
confirmed that human migration would be one of the most important consequences of 
anthropogenic climate change (Deprez, 2010, 1). Forced movement places families and 
communities at risk both economically and socially, creating undue strain on groups that 
are already marginalized and disenfranchised. Warming temperatures, decreased 
precipitation, SLR and increased storm frequency have destroyed subsistence crops and 
devastated once prosperous land, deeply harming small farmers. It is under these 
conditions that many people, including large numbers of indigenous peoples, have been 
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forced to migrate from the region of Chiapas, Mexico. The following case study will 
detail this migration and the current situation there.  
Case Study: Increased Migration in Chiapas, Mexico 
 The region of Chiapas is one of the poorest states in all of Mexico. It has the 
lowest GDP per capita and has traditionally struggled socio-economically. Though the 
region has been marred by poverty and internal political strife, it has not historically been 
known for its out migration like some areas of the country (Alscher, 2009, 17). Out-
migration has been a relatively new occurrence in the last decade and can, in part, be 
connected to climate change factors. Chiapas is particularly affected by climate change 
and its outcomes due to its location. It is directly in the path of many tropical storms and 
environmental disturbances that put it at risk for severe and repetitive storm damage. The 
state also shares a border with the Pacific Ocean, which has made it vulnerable to sea 
level rising. Additionally, Chiapas is home to many indigenous subsistence farmers who 
have suffered from lack of rain and desertification of their land, forcing them to migrate.  
 Mexican researchers generally cite the agricultural crisis since the 1980’s and the 
violent conflicts after the Zapatista rebellion in the 1990’s as the main factors for the 
growing migration outflow (Alscher, 2009, 19). Yet it is important to recognize that 
much of the migration in the last several years has been complicated by global climate 
change. The area has suffered from rising out-migration as hurricanes have become 
stronger and more recurrent, in direct correlation to varying weather patterns created by 
climatic changes (Deprez, 2010, 1). Mexico’s National Meteorological Service has said 
that drought periods are getting longer and more extreme in several regions of the 
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country. The state of Chiapas has the added problem of increasingly torrential rainfalls 
that create flooding and destroy homes and crops (Alscher, 2009, 8). These changes have 
all been linked to a changing climate. As a result, the ability of many indigenous families 
to provide sustainable livelihoods for themselves has been hampered, increasing 
migration from the region to more productive or secure areas. 
6. Overlooked Secondary Effects of Climate Change 
 The effects of climate change within a Latin American context are primarily 
tangible in nature. Changes in temperature, reduction in precipitation, strength and 
frequency of storm patterns and rising sea levels, are all changes that can be seen and felt 
in people’s everyday experiences. Specifically for indigenous Latin Americans, climate 
changes effects on food security, water availability, and land use are changes that can 
also be easily perceived. Yet recently, less tangible changes have been occurring at a 
societal and social level that are not as easily articulated by those experiencing them or 
by researchers trying to understand them. Climate change and its residual effects are 
having an impact on regional conflicts, gender equality, and overall social cohesion in 
both a broader Latin American context and more specifically for indigenous groups.  
 In 2007 the German Advisory Council on Global Change published a report 
called “World in Transition: Global Climate Change as a Security Risk.” It detailed the 
general risks of climate change on international, regional, and local security and 
highlighted the importance of addressing climate change in order to avoid future conflict 
risks. Experts fear that climatic change and instability will lead to amplified violence and 
conflict, especially in impoverished and marginalized areas. As discussed above, many 
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indigenous groups in Latin America are, in fact, living marginalized lives within extreme 
poverty. The report defines what are considered “conflict constellations,” which are 
typical causal linkages at the interface of environment and society, whose dynamic can 
lead to social destabilization and, in the end, to violence (Shubert, 2007, 2). There are 
four so-called conflict constellations that are highlighted by the report: climate-induced 
degradation of freshwater resources, climate-induced decline of food production and food 
production systems, climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters, and 
environmentally-induced migration (Shubert, 2007. 3-4).  
 Indigenous peoples throughout the Latin America suffer from varying 
combinations of these four conflict constellations. In the cases of both Central America 
and Mexico, they suffer acutely from all four. Tensions that have already manifested 
themselves in struggling and oppressed indigenous areas have the potential to become 
worse with the exacerbation of the negative impacts of climate change. In addition, it is 
possible that further conflict both regionally and internationally could stem from the 
anger of countries and peoples heavily affected by climate change towards countries and 
peoples that are viewed as not doing enough to cut their own emissions (IRIN, 2007, 1). 
The chances of conflict and violence within communities over allocation of resources, as 
well as increased strife between international and local actors could both be amplified as 
climate change continues.  
 In addition to the risk of insecurity and violence, climate change serves to further 
complicate the livelihoods of women around the world and exacerbates already existing 
inequalities and rights abuses. Indigenous women in Latin America have historically 
struggled for their rights and for equality with their male counterparts. Although there are 
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indigenous women who, through systems of collective ownership, are able to have a 
significant role in both domestic and economic affairs, many face discrimination, sexual 
violence and an unfair work burden. They also tend to be responsible for the bulk of 
parenting and child rearing duties. Therefore, indigenous women are often burdened with 
both their marginalized status as indigenous peoples, as well as their oppressed status as 
women. On top of a multitude of gender related inequities, women throughout the world 
are particularly affected by climate change as a result of their disproportionate 
involvement in reproduction work, their insecure property rights, limited access to 
resources, and reduced mobility (Macchi, 2008, 5). This is especially true of indigenous 
women. When climatic changes complicate an already inequitable livelihood, a woman’s 
lack of access to resources, mobility and property hampers her ability to adapt to climate 
change in the ways that her male counterpart may be able to.  
 Women are particularly susceptible to the impacts of natural disasters. This 
susceptibility provides an example of the complications climate change poses to the 
livelihoods of women. When hurricanes, floods or other weather phenomenon occur 
more frequently due to climatic changes, the domestic duties of a woman are made 
exponentially more difficult. Along with these challenges, natural disasters can further 
hamper her ability to mobilize and can place more barriers on her capacity to acquire 
food and water resources for herself and her children. In an unequal world, the obstacles 
that women face in securing their rights are amplified by complications from the 
acceleration of climate change.   
 Lastly, climate change can harm social cohesion within indigenous groups in 
Latin America. Indigenous peoples are profoundly reliant on social ties and networks to 
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define themselves within their communities. They often maintain social and economic 
relationships among varied groups within a small region and in many places in Latin 
America still utilize systems of food and labor sharing that include exchange, reciprocity, 
barter and local markets. They often remain unaffiliated with larger national, regional, or 
global systems (Macchi, 2008, 17). As a result of climate change and its impacts on their 
communities, indigenous peoples could become increasingly dependent on outside 
sources for resource allocation and more reliant on aid provided by states, NGO’s, or 
international organizations. This would be especially true in times of crisis that they may 
not have the capacity to adapt to (Macchi, 2008, 17). Indigenous groups have often 
resided in the same villages or areas for hundreds, if not thousands of years, and have 
developed intricate and meaningful ways of tying subsistence activities to their social 
networks that are used to define the very nature of their communal identities.  
 The allocation, distribution and use of water in Andean communities illustrate the 
ties between necessary subsistence activities, that of securing and providing water for a 
community, and social networks. Water rights in Andean indigenous communities are 
typically granted to families, all of whom belong to a water collective. This is vastly 
different than many water ownership processes in most of Latin America, which are 
based on individual (mainly male) ownership models (Boelens, 2008, 130). The 
participating families build important elements of their identity by forming part of a 
community and its collective irrigation system. Moreover, the rights of individuals are 
directly derived from this collective rights system and their membership responsibilities 
(Boelens, 2008, 130).  Therefore the connection between social identity is directly 
connected to the activity of water distribution, as well as other economic and political 
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activities. If climate change continues to escalate, the pressures that already exist for 
indigenous communities will continue to worsen, possibly forcing them to abandon 
systems that have defined individuals, families and communities for generations. The loss 
of communal systems like that of water irrigation in the Andes would be detrimental to 





INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND NATION STATE 
RESPONSES 
1. The COP 15 and the Copenhagen Accord 
 As the realities of climate change have become apparent in the last several 
decades, the international community, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1, has begun to take 
steps to address the emerging issues. It has become clear that in order to deal with climate 
change the UN, in cooperation with nation states, must take far more aggressive measures 
than simply protecting the natural environment as it had done in the past. Now 
international actors are tasked with finding ways to curb the sources of climate change, 
mitigating the effects on the world’s population and helping many adapt to the changes 
that are already taking place around the globe. The methods used to accomplish such 
progressive steps need to be much more elaborate and far more specific than any created 
in the past. The UNEP had dealt with many environmental issues in the past but met new 
challenges when the problems of global climate change came into focus. Understanding 
that climate change needed to be addressed specifically, the UN sought to create an 
internal body that would deal solely with climate change issues. Hence, the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change (ICCC) was founded in 1988 by the 
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UNEP and served as recognition that climate change was indeed real and needed the 
attention of the international community (UNEP, 2010, http://www.unep.org/.). 
 Following the creation of the ICCC, the Untied Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created in 1992 so that real legislative steps could be 
taken to combat climate change. Its inception was the first major and significant result of 
the Conference of Rio de Janeiro, held between June 3 and 14 of that year. The UNFCCC 
proceeded to move beyond simply researching and understanding climate change. Its 
purpose was to actively attempt to alleviate climate change by stabilizing greenhouse gas 
emissions in the atmosphere. With nearly universal ratification by 192 countries, the 
UNFCCC came into force on March 21, 1994 (Sampaio, 2009, 2). One of the most 
important contributions of the UNFCCC on climate change discourse was its creation of 
the annual meeting of the Conferences of Parties (COP). These COP gatherings have 
been held every year since 1995 and aim to facilitate cooperation among UNFCCC 
member countries.  
 It was hoped that this cooperation would further the UNFCCC’s mission of 
mitigating human interference in the processes of climate change (Sampaio, 2009, 5). 
However, the results of the early conferences were not legally binding, which meant that 
the participating countries were urged but not required to curb their greenhouse gas 
emissions. The lack of any form of legally binding agreement that would force 
compliance to strict emissions reductions was a glaring weakness in the system. 
Therefore, nations agreed that real and progressive action needed to be taken and goals 
were set to create a binding piece of legislation at the COP 3, to be held in 1997. COP 3, 
arguably the most well known of any of the conferences, was held in Kyoto, Japan and 
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saw the creation of the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol was tied to the UNFCCC and 
created supposedly binding emission reduction targets for thirty-seven industrialized 
nations and the European Union in hopes of substantially curbing greenhouse gases and 
mitigating climate change (UNFCCC, 2010, http://unfccc.int/2860.php).  
 Since 1997, a number of problems have emerged over the Kyoto Protocol. First, 
though the agreement was said to be binding, no real measures were ever put into place to 
hold countries to their targets. Since the late 1990’s many of the committed countries 
have failed to even come close to their reduction goals, reducing both the normative force 
and concrete value of the agreement. Secondly, the United States failed to ever accept the 
obligations that were set forth by the protocol, which greatly hampered its efficacy. 
Thirdly, the goals set within Kyoto are set to expire in 2012, with no other binding 
resolution to take its place. Therefore, it was the major goal of the COP 15, held in 
Copenhagen in 2009, to create a binding emissions agreement that would take the place 
of Kyoto in 2012. Unfortunately, this did not come to fruition and the only thing that the 
COP 15 was able to produce was the Copenhagen Accord. The document, created by the 
United States, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil, falls short of the expectations many 
had for a document that would take the place of the Kyoto Protocol. In the end, the 
UNFCCC agreed only to “take notice” of the accord, leaving it with very little normative, 
substance or legislative power. 
 The Copenhagen Accord received criticism for a number of reasons. First, it was 
negotiated by of only a handful of countries, just a fraction of the 192 conference party 
member states. According to Martin Khor of the South Centre, who is a detractor of the 
accord, “the hiving off [of] some countries into a separate track with a separate document 
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is not the right way to conduct global climate negotiations. The way forward is to return 
to the multilateral forum, where the complex issues have to be sorted out” (Khor, 2010, 
4). Second, not only did the document fail to replace the emissions standards of Kyoto, it 
actually moved backwards from the 1997 goals. Barack Obama has tried to commit cuts 
for the US in the range of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. This may sound progressive 
but would only account for a 4% cut below 1990 levels, which is 1% less than would 
have been binding through Kyoto (Doyle, 2010, 3). Additionally, the International 
Energy Agency has calculated that all the action plans that countries have submitted 
through the Copenhagen Accord thus far will not stabilize long-term concentration levels 
of GHG’s at a level to hold temperature changes to the goal of a 2 degree Celsius rise, 
which was the expectation set by the COP 15. Adversely, the pledges would create levels 
of a 3-degree Celsius rise, much higher than many countries would like (Chazan, 2010, 
1). 
  Thirdly, the accord has been criticized by indigenous communities for being void 
of any forest protection or protection of indigenous peoples who are facing the worst 
effects of higher temperature changes and other climatic events. They have been left 
vulnerable in the final text from the COP 15 (McDonald, 2009, 1). In all, the COP 15 is 
seen largely as a failure on both the grassroots and international level. Not only did it fail 
to create any binding resolution, as hoped for, but the document it produced actually took 
steps backward from the goals of the COP 3. As the consequences of climate change are 
becoming more and more apparent and the speed at which the devastation from them 
seems to be increasing, the international community has made little progress toward 
curbing emissions or finding consensus on the most effective ways to do so. Further, the 
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divisions between developed and developing countries is widening and the COP seems to 
be unable to initiate the cooperation that is needed between the world’s wealthiest nations 
and the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.  
2. Adaptation, Mitigation, Capacity Building and Technology Transfers 
 As an international body, the UN, through the UNEP, the UNFCCC and other 
sub-groups, has put forth a number of solutions to deal with the effects of climate change. 
Aside from attempting to curb emissions coming out of the industrialized world, the UN 
has also had to address the effects that the changes have had and how to create safeguards 
for populations being adversely affected. Through an evaluation of the vulnerability of 
specific populations, the UN has created several strategies to aid these populations. 
According to Omar D. Cardona, vulnerability is defined as an internal risk factor of the 
subject or system and represents the physical, economic, political or social susceptibility 
of a community to damage from anthropogenic changes (Cardona, 2003, 1.) To tackle 
this vulnerability, the UN and the international community have offered two solutions, 
adaptation and mitigation.  
 Concepts of adaptation can be defined either by anticipative or reactive measures 
to alleviate the adverse impacts of climate change, or as actions taken to help 
communities and ecosystems cope with the change in condition or adjustments (Sampaio, 
2009, 24). Adaptation efforts are headed by the Adaptation Fund, a creation of the 
UNFCCC as a source for funding through market-based methods (Czarnecki, 2009, 79). 
The overall purpose of the fund is to finance concrete adaption projects and programs and 
to provide direct access to the funds for populations in need (Czarnecki, 2009, 81). Some 
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examples of specific adaptation strategies include crop diversification to minimize 
harvest risk, changes in living areas, changes in hunting and gathering periods and 
diversification of food consumption and storage (Macchi, 2008, 41). Ideally, adaptation is 
locally driven and guided by stakeholder participation that is fundamental to the 
successful reduction of vulnerability (Eakin, 2007, 938). Yet, what begins at the local 
level must be supported by additional financial resources and technology that will allow 
populations without the means to deal with climate change to do so (DESA, 2009, 114).  
 Along with the promotion of adaptation for vulnerable populations, the UN 
supports the strategy of mitigation. The Contribution of Working Group III to the  
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change outlines 
mitigation and its strategies at exhaustive length. For the purpose of this thesis a much-
shortened version will be offered in order to explain the basic concept behind it. The 
concept of mitigation seeks to do exactly what it says: to mitigate or moderate the GHG’s 
that are causing the largest proportion of global climate change. The hope of the UN, and 
specifically the IPCCC, is that mitigation will curb the overall temperature rise and allow 
for easier adaptation. Current mitigation efforts include a wide range of tactics that, like 
adaptation, are largely market oriented. These initiatives include bio-fuel plantations, 
hydropower dams, geothermal plants and a series of projects to deal with emissions 
reductions in general. These would hopefully reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation, in particular through REDD, which will be discussed in detail later in 
this work (DESA, 2009, 116).  
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 Through adaptation and mitigation strategies, the UN envisions ways in which all 
populations, but especially marginalized and threatened groups, can deal with the current 
and future effects of climate change. Yet, looking at the forms of adaptation and 
mitigation being offered, it is easy to see that these strategies can be costly and difficult, 
especially for poor majorities in many developing nations. Therefore, the UN also 
supports capacity building and technology transfers in order to support adaptation and 
mitigation. According to the ICPP, the ability of a system to adjust to climate changes, 
which include climate variability and extremes, to moderate potential damages, to take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with potential consequences make up a country’s 
“active capacity.” Many countries around the world lack adaptive capacity and therefore 
it is hoped that capacity building will alleviate difficulties. According to the UNEP, 
capacity building consists of strengthening the national institutions responsible for 
environmental issues as well as for the implementation of multilateral agreements that 
will promote the achievement of the objective of sustainable environmental protections. 
Further, capacity building should support local and a national dissemination of the best 
practices and experiences to deal with environmental change (UNDP, 2004, 2). In effect, 
these policies wish to pass scientific knowledge from the developed to the developing 
world in order to enable adaptation and mitigation.  
 In addition to a push for greater capacity building within nation states, the UN has 
also made moves to improve the flow of useful technologies to groups who will benefit 
from them. Called technology transfers, Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC states that developed 
countries shall “take all practical steps to promote, facilitate, and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other 
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Parties, particularly developing country Parties to enable them to implement the 
provisions of the convention” (Kulkarni, 2003, 257). Further, the IPCC, which serves as 
advisor to the UNFCCC, has defined technology transfers as “a broad set of processes 
covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting 
to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector 
enterprises, financial institutions, NGO’s, and research/education institutions” (Kulkarni, 
2003, 257). Similar to capacity building, the UN hopes to provide tools for developing, 
underprepared populations so that they may deal with climate change and adapt to new 
challenges.  
3. Carbon Markets, REDD and Migration Control 
 Clearly, in attempting to control climate change and alleviate its symptoms, the 
international community, spearheaded by the UN, has pushed for market-based solutions 
to a growing global problem. Adaptation and mitigation, along with capacity building and 
technology transfers, seek to answer the dilemmas of climate change through many of the 
same apparatuses that are customary in the modern globalized world. These methods rely 
on profit based markets and technological advances and are akin to neo-liberal policies 
similar to those put forth by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) during the 1980’s. These trends are further shown in the prevalence of carbon 
markets, or cap and trade systems, as well as the “Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” scheme, or REDD. Both methods, which are 
supported by the UN and many industrialized nations, commodify the natural 
environment in order to create both revenue and incentive for states and other groups to 
  54 
conserve and protect the environment. It is, in turn, hoped that these monetary incentives 
will foster the goals of conservation and protection, which will then mitigate the effects 
of climate change.  
 Carbon markets have emerged with strong backing from many on the international 
stage in the last decade. Simply, they are a mechanism that allows for the buying, selling 
and trading of carbon output credits, utilizing a method of capping emissions at certain 
set levels. This can be done either voluntary or mandatorily. First, a voluntary carbon 
market involves the emitter of carbon volunteering to reduce their own carbon emissions 
by buying allowances from other countries or large corporations, who then will use the 
money towards diminishing the carbon concentrations in the atmosphere. Second, in 
mandatory carbon markets the emitter has a carbon emission limit imposed onto them. 
Therefore, they must find ways to conduct business, whether at the state or corporate 
level, within these limitations. This creates a market in which lower emitting entities can 
save their allowances and then sell them to those who need them, hence the term cap and 
trade (Sampaio, 2009, 24).  
 Shorty after the Copenhagen meeting of the COP, the European Union came out 
strongly in favor of strong carbon markets as a primary way to end climate change.  In a 
report by the European Commission, the body called for the maintenance of a well-
functioning carbon market that would be “essential for driving low-carbon investments 
and achieving global mitigation objectives in a cost effective manner” (Commission to 
the European Parliament, 2010, 11). It is believed that carbon markets will generate 
important monetary flow to developing countries and will aid in fueling adaptation and 
capacity building. Further, the commission addressed the upcoming COP 16 that will be 
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held in Cancun, Mexico and the importance that should be placed on pushing for better 
carbon markets during the gathering. The commission stated that “a major goal for 
Cancun should be to anchor the improved and new carbon market mechanisms as means 
to reach ambitious mitigation objectives and generate financial flows to developing 
countries. In addition it should provide a basis for the creation of new sector-wide 
mechanisms” (European Commission, 2010, 12).  
 The international community has sought to mitigate climate change through the 
promotion of overall emissions reductions and GHG control through carbon markets. By 
extension, the UN and many nation states have begun to promote forest stewardship as 
one of the main ways to help reduce the amount of carbon and other dangerous and 
harmful GHG’s into the atmosphere. Creating what are called carbon sinks, large forest 
and jungle areas like the Amazon provide a large amount of filtration, purifying the 
atmosphere that surrounds them of harmful gases and releasing oxygen. This process 
helps to reduce the amount of GHG’s and, by extension, aids to combat global climate 
change. By supporting programs that both save existing forest areas, as well as contribute 
to the replanting of trees, the international community seeks to reward stewards through 
monetary and carbon offset compensation in hopes that those rewards will perpetuate a 
cycle of conservation, addressing climate change while creating market-based solutions 
for developing actors.  
 REDD is a relatively new solution that is being promoted by the international 
community to address climate change. It was fundamentally developed in 2005 at the 
COP 11 in Montreal (Parker, 2010, 12). Subsequently highlighted at the COP 15 in 
Copenhagen, REDD seems to be one place in which the “global north” and the “global 
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south,” or developed and developing countries can find ample common ground. The 
“global north” is attracted to REDD because of the potential for easy and cheap emissions 
reductions and low cost offsets and the “global south” is attracted to REDD for the lure of 
finance and investment opportunities (Alden Wily, 2010, 13). According to The Little 
REDD handbook, an informational document produced by The Global Canopy Program: 
 “The basic idea behind Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
 (REDD) is simple: Countries that are willing and able to reduce emissions from 
 deforestation should be financially compensated for doing so.  Previous 
 approaches to curb global deforestation have so far been unsuccessful, however, 
 and REDD provides a new framework to allow deforesting countries to break this 
 historic trend” (Parker, 2010, 12)  
 
Those who believe strongly in the force that REDD could have on climate change are 
pushing for the next climate agreement to have incentives that remunerate forest nations 
for the valuable climate services that they provide to the world (Parker, 2010, 4).  
 Lastly, the international community has been faced with the growing trend of cross 
border migration that has escalated in the last decade due to climate-induced hardships. 
Although economic and political factors are currently the dominant drivers of 
displacement and migration worldwide, climate change is beginning to have a detectable 
effect and is complicating current scenarios (Warner, 2009, IV). As discussed earlier, 
changes in temperature and precipitation patterns, glacial melting and sea level rise all 
greatly affect farming operations and subsistence livelihoods all over the world. As 
climate change increases so does the frequency and intensity of those situations, as well 
as natural disasters, which create a rise in temporarily and permanently displaced peoples. 
This will continue to be especially true in countries that are unable or fail to invest in 
disaster risk reduction (Warner, 2009, IV). In response, the international community has 
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sought to control migration by both facilitating movement from areas that are at risk to 
such changes and prohibiting movement to areas that are seen as unstable. In some cases, 
governments are undertaking large-scale action to move populations, thereby managing 
the migration process (Warner, 2009, 21). Also, the international community has taken 
into account that migration itself is a product of climate change and by preventing these 
changes through implementation of adaptation measures, migration will become less of 
an issue. Overall, migration due to environmental change is a problem that the 
international community is just beginning to recognize. The international community has 




CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL GRASSROOTS 
RESPONSES 
1. NGO’s, Grassroots Organization and Locally Based Initiatives 
 As the planet rapidly changes and the world’s population struggles with the ever-
growing consequences of climate change on both the human population and the rest of 
the natural environment, both national and international perspectives on the crisis are 
framed by the actions carried out by the UN and by nation states. Although this level of 
response is important and could potentially hold the key to the most expedient and 
effective solutions to climate change, it is a system plagued by inefficiencies at every 
turn. From a lack of commitment and funding to issues of transparency and 
accountability, the international apparatuses that have been built up by the UN in the last 
two decades are inadequate and have failed to deliver permanent solutions to those most 
in need. In reaction to the inability of bodies like the UNFCCC to provide a reliable 
framework for aid, as well as to the unwillingness of most developed nations to 
contribute adequate funding for many of the proposed international solutions, NGO’s, 
grassroots organizations and locally based initiatives have gained momentum in the last 
several years.  
 NGO’s based in developed countries, as well as an assorted group of locally based 
actors in developing countries, have begun to address both the effects of climate change 
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on a small scale, as well as to consider how to influence policy initiatives and climate 
solutions at the international level. These groups often include indigenous actors and are 
frequently influenced by indigenous concepts of subsistence livelihoods, collective 
ownership and communal ideals. Indigenous peoples throughout the world have 
recognized that the rapid pace of human-induced climate change calls for decisive action 
not only at the international level but also at the national and local levels in order to fill 
the implementation gap and fully respect indigenous peoples’ environmental rights 
(DESA, 2009, 107). The list of NGO’s working toward locally based solutions to climate 
change, while attempting to create dialogue at the international level, is impressive. Large 
and well known NGO’s like Oxfam International and CARE, which traditionally work on 
any number of pressing issues, from human rights abuses to famine relief, have actively 
taken on the issues that surround climate change. Recognizing that many of the worst 
changes are afflicting communities that they are already working within, these NGO’s 
have contributed to the academic work on climate change through briefing papers and 
reports and have campaigned on the ground, sponsoring initiatives specific to climate 
change in areas of need. 
 In addition to larger organization based mainly in developed countries, there has 
been a growth of grassroots and local initiatives in developing countries and in areas that 
are being acutely affected by climate change instability. In Latin America, as well as all 
over the world, small and locally based organizations made up of campesina farmers, 
women’s collectives, indigenous communities, and other highly marginalized and 
disenfranchised peoples have formed to address climate change and its effects. These 
groups vary in goal orientation, some aiming to address local difficulties with resource 
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allocation, others wishing to push for further involvement by their national government 
on climate change issues, and others attempting to bridge the large gap between local 
problems and international solutions by creating a forum for local voices in international 
discourse. The presence of many of these grassroots groups was felt heavily at the COP 
15 in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Activists and grassroots campaigners from all over 
the world, who represented many people struggling with climate change issues, flooded 
to the COP to voice their concerns over the growing effects of climate change, as well as 
to present alternatives to market-based solutions and the international agenda as it 
currently stands.  
  But possibly the most powerful and effective way for these groups to make their 
concerns and their ideas for change heard at the nation state and international level is to 
form coalitions and to work together. The pairing of a large NGO or other organization 
from the developed world with several smaller and less influential groups can often times 
gain more attention than when organizations attempt to work alone. The credibility and 
experience of an organization from the developed world, paired with the local 
knowledge, experience and passion of smaller grassroots groups can form a union that 
both regional and international powers feel more compelled to pay attention to. Recently, 
at the end of 2008, several groups of varying size and influence came together to voice 
their opposition to the definition of “forests” under the UNFCCC and REDD climate 
policies. At the COP 14 in Poznan, Poland, the groups Global Forest Coalition, The 
Wilderness Society, World Rainforest Movement, Global Justice Ecology Project, Via 
Campesina, The International Youth Delegation and the STOP GE Trees Campaign 
united and were able to garner attention that separately would have been impossible to 
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achieve. Together they made a strong statement that many varied groups from all walks 
of life and of all livelihood backgrounds care enough about a certain climate change issue 
to come together and address it (Global Justice Equality Project, 2008, 1). It is in these 
seemingly small but extraordinarily meaningful ways that a grassroots movement, based 
both locally and internationally, is developing throughout the world and could possibly 
begin to inform and influence climate change policies at the national and international 
levels. It remains to be seen whether NGO’s and grassroots organizations will harness 
this potential and if the international community will see the value in listening to and 
attempting to follow the insights offered.  
2. Key Concepts: Climate Justice and Climate Debt 
 It is important to bear in mind that the differences between mainstream 
international responses to climate issues and responses at the NGO or grassroots level are 
not just that of size or influence, but more importantly of the fundamentals that define the 
proposed solutions. At that heart of the raging debate over appropriate actions on climate 
change are profound differences on what the best solutions are and how those solutions 
should be implemented. Further, there tends to be great disagreement on who should be 
accountable for climate based instability around the world and how the burden of the 
changes should be distributed. Internationally, as discussed above, there is a heavy 
emphasis put on market-based solution to climate change. Policy through the UN, as well 
as many policies put forth by developed and developing governments, support various 
market-based methods to mitigate and adapt to climate changes while also using these 
methods to fund mitigation and adaptation strategies. These methods are strongly based 
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in capitalist ideals and follow the very models of governance, commerce, trade and 
development that industrialized nations have perpetuated, causing the majority of 
anthropogenic climate change in the first place. And while many actors at the 
international level are willing to concede that the developed world has, and still is 
causing most of the effects of climate change, they are often hesitant or completely 
unwilling to curb habits that contribute to it or provide support that would offset their 
actions. 
 Alternatively, many NGO’s and grassroots actors are in support of finding other 
solutions to climate change that would move the global community away from market-
based solutions and provide more sustainable and long term coping mechanisms and 
alleviation strategies. Correctly, it has been pointed out by grassroots climate activists, as 
well as academics in the scientific field, that climate change has been structurally fueled 
by a global society that is based on consumption. Consumption of goods and services that 
are shipped back and forth throughout the world, consumption of food and other 
agricultural products that are grown locally only to be shipped, sold and eaten abroad, 
and consumption of natural resources such as fossil fuels, minerals and fresh water that 
are disappearing at an alarming rate. Since the turn of the twentieth century, capitalist 
markets, globalization and industrialization have fueled this consumption and have 
directly resulted in present climate issues. According to Justin Lin, chief economist at the 
World Bank, about 75 to 80% of the damages caused by global climate change will be 
suffered by developing countries, although they only contribute about one-third of the 
greenhouse gases (Klein, 2009, 1). Understanding these inequities, many find it 
unreasonable that the international community would rely on these same markets to solve 
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climate problems without attempting to find alternatives that would alleviate the effect of 
climate disasters on historically marginalized populations and move towards ending the 
crisis by terminating the direct contributing factors. It is within this context that two 
major concepts have become the touchstones of current alternative climate change 
solutions: climate justice and climate debt.  
 First, the concept of climate justice that has emerged within grassroots climate 
change movement is important to understand because its ideals are a major departure 
from what has been offered at the international level in the last decade and a half. Climate 
justice theories and concepts find their basis in a combination of ideals from 
environmental protection and social justice approaches. Dough King of The Witherspoon 
Society of the Presbyterian Church, USA states, 
 Social justice provides the foundation for a healthy community. It grows out of our 
 sense that each person — each created being — has value…To help the process 
 along we develop attitudes of respect for one another. We also shape policies and 
 patterns of behavior to protect and enhance the worth of each person. We do this by 
 building governmental and economic structures, educational and religious 
 institutions, and all the other systems that provide for health and social welfare 
 (Mayer, 2007, 1). 
 
Rooted in doctrines of faith, as well as law and politics, movements for social justice 
have fought against many human rights abuses throughout the world. As it has become 
clear in the last several years that the effects of climate change are adversely 
complicating the lives of the worlds most impoverished and marginalized citizens, 
concern has grown that anthropogenic climate change is a human rights violation to those 
that it disproportionately affects. The victimization of populations who contribute little to 
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the causes of climate change has been an unintended consequence of globalization and an 
industrialized world, but nonetheless is a stark reality for millions around the world. 
 In reaction, various NGO’s and local grassroots efforts have formed to demand a 
new and more specific kind of social justice that would protect the world’s most 
vulnerable populations against circumstances which they have little ability to control. 
Hence the so-called movement for climate justice has found strength and momentum in 
the last several years. According to the website ‘actforclimatejustice.org,’ climate justice 
is defined as the following: 
 “climate justice is a vision to dissolve and alleviate the unequal burdens created 
 by climate change. As a form of environmental justice, climate justice is the fair 
 treatment of all people and freedom from discrimination with the creation of 
 policies and projects that address climate change and the systems that create 
 climate change and perpetuate discrimination” (Act for Climate Justice, 2010, 
 http://www.actforclimatejustice.org/about/what-is-climate-justice/). 
 
One of the most important principles that seem to be guiding the push for climate justice 
is the belief that the pressures and changes scientifically attributed to anthropogenic 
climate change should be seen through an ethical framework and are inherently moral in 
nature.  
 According to the organization Climate Justice Now, their principles are guided by 
the fact that the so-called global north has contributed to the overwhelming majority of 
climate change and that, up to this point, populations in the global south have borne the 
burden of those changes. They further believe that the solutions being offered currently 
from the Untied Nations and other international bodies such as the IMF and the World 
Bank are false solutions that only serve to further the interests of the industrialized world 
and pander to the whims of the consumer classes both in the global north and the growing 
  65 
middle and upper classes in the global south. To ensure the curbing of emissions and to 
mitigate the climate crisis, supporters of climate justice support clean energy and an end 
to fossil fuel use, radically reducing consumption by both those in developed and 
developing countries, sustainable family farming and fishing, human rights based 
resource conservation and the huge transfer of financial aid from developed to developing 
areas. The transfer of monetary support would come through a system of so-called 
climate debt repayments from wealthy nations to those most affected by climate change. 
Based on historical emissions since industrialization, this system would transfer wealth 
from those most responsible for current conditions to countries with little historical 
emissions record. The funding would be for use in adaptation and mitigation, as well as 
for sustainable development.  
 Within the climate change and climate justice discourse the relatively new 
concept of climate debt is both controversial and forward thinking and a complete 
departure to any solution that has been offered either by the international community or 
by traditional climate change activists. Departing from American and other western 
environmentalism that tends to treat climate change as a force that transcends differences, 
(we all share this fragile planet and therefore the changes that are occurring), the case for 
climate debt actually stresses the differences, zeroing in on the cruel contrast between 
those who have caused the climate crisis and those who are suffering its worst effects 
(Klein, 2009, 1). Climate debt supporters highlight these stark contrasts and demand that 
something be done to reconcile them. They propose that rich and privileged nations 
should be forced to pay reparations to poor nations for the crisis they have produced.  
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 Compounding the fact that many who are suffering most extensively from climate 
change have little to no “carbon footprint,” is that these same populations lack the 
funding to support clean energy resources and infrastructure, sustainable and clean 
development alternatives or adaptation and mitigation technologies, which are many of 
the very things the international community supports to curb climate change. In June of 
2009, shortly before the COP 15 in Copenhagen, Angelica Navarro, the Bolivian climate 
negotiator, explained these difficulties at the UN climate negotiations in Bonn, Germany. 
She then expounded upon what she and other climate debt supporters see as a feasible 
solution through the international community. First, wealthy countries need to pay the 
costs that will be associated with adapting to climate change. Then, deep cuts should be 
made to their own emissions levels to make “atmospheric space” available for the 
developing world. And last, the developed world should facilitate paying for developing 
countries to leapfrog over fossil fuels and go straight to supplying cleaner and more 
sustainable energy sources for their citizens (Klein, 2009, 2). In recent months, climate 
debt theory has gained widespread support, significantly among developing governments 
and officials around the world. The governments of Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Paraguay and 
Malaysia, as well as a growing number of African and island nations have endorsed the 
call for climate debts to be paid (Klein, 2009, 2). 
 The controversial nature of the theory of climate debt is not lost on its supporters. 
The road towards any kind of commitment will be a long one, considering that the COP 
15 did not even produce a binding commitment that would take the place of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2012. Critics of the idea claim it would also be impossible to scientifically 
place numbered values on the emissions of nations currently and would be even more 
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impossible to do so in a historical context. Yet, climate debt has the potential to be far 
more concrete than most skeptics give it credit for. Antonio Hill, who is the senior 
climate advisor for Oxfam says “what is exciting is you can really put numbers on it. We 
can measure it in tons of CO2 and come up with a cost” (Klein, 2009, 2). Yet a study 
from 2008 out of the Netherlands correctly points out the further difficulties for climate 
debt supporters, as the responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions begins to shift from 
solely industrialized countries to more developing countries like China and India. 
  “The change in relative cumulative contributions will alter the ethical parameters 
 of the debate on climate policy. In the near future the responsibility for the 
 ‘climate debt’ will be shared by the largest emitters at this moment-Western 
 Europe and the USA- and rapidly developing countries, such as India and 
 especially China. Based on these projections, it is vital that [countries like] China 
 and India participate in future climate agreements” (Botzen, 2008, 570). 
 
3. Major Disagreements with Mainstream International Climate Solutions 
 For a growing number of people the solutions offered by the international 
community are inadequate to deal with the effects of climate change and frustrations with 
the actions, or inactions of the international community and developed nations are 
mounting. NGO’s, grassroots activists, locally based groups and developing state leaders 
are increasingly criticizing many components of the frameworks being agreed upon 
through the UN and are critical of the UNFCCC and the COP meetings themselves. 
Market-based solutions, adaptation and mitigation funding, REDD, and the inadequacy of 
technology transferring mechanisms have all come under fire as ill equipped, misguided 
answers to one of the futures greatest dilemmas.  
 Generally speaking, the entire international framework for curbing and dealing 
with climate change has been questioned by climate change activists and by developing 
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countries. The apparatuses that have been put into effect by both the UNFCCC and the 
COP in the last several decades are seen as insufficient primarily due to their non-binding 
status. Optimism had run high after the Kyoto Protocol but most of the steps taken 
internationally since then have been woefully inadequate. Furthermore, in a report called 
International Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen, the European Commission confirmed that 
the pledges by developed countries are currently equal to between 13.2% and 17.8% in 
emissions reductions by 2020-far below the required 40% that Kyoto strove to enforce 
(Romero, 2010, 1). Adding to the frustration is the fact the Copenhagen Accord has been 
propped up internationally as a success while it is gravely insufficient. It actually allows 
for an increase in developed countries emissions of 2.6% above 1990 levels and instead 
of being legally binding it allows countries to submit their own targets (Romero, 2010, 
2).  
 Those who counter the international response to climate change also disagree with 
the abundant use of market-based solutions. It has been made clear that anthropogenic 
climate change has occurred largely due to the stresses and strains created by an 
industrialized, consumption based global marketplace that relies heavily on the tenets of 
capitalism to drive it. Therefore, it is troubling to many climate justice proponents and 
developing county citizens that the solutions to the crisis would be market-based. In a 
paper addressing climate change, Evo Morales, president of Bolivia and an indigenous 
Aymara said, “In the hands of capitalism everything is a commodity: the water, the soil, 
the human genome, the ancestral cultures, justice, ethics, death…and life itself. 
Everything…can be bought and sold and under capitalist even “climate change” itself has 
become a business” (Morales, 2010, 1). Here he summarizes many groups’ frustrations 
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with market-based solutions that rely on carbon markets and cap and trade to solve 
climate change issues. 
  Gustavo Castro Soto is the founding member of Otros Munods, an NGO that 
works on popular education and developing alternatives to capitalism, as well as with the 
Mexican Network for People Affected by Mining (REMA). When asked to discuss his 
group’s feelings on market-based solutions he replied, 
 “Our political position is very clear: clean development mechanisms don’t work. 
 With them the appropriation of indigenous and peasant territories is justified, 
 deforestation is justified, and as well, the very projects of transnational  
 companies are carrying out for profits are justified. These projects include 
 ecotourism, highways, forest plantations, bio-fuels, hydroelectric dams, and 
 mining, they just kept looking for justification, and not just legal justification 
 through free trade agreements, but justifications related to climate change. 
 Our position is very clear. Bio-fuels, large monoculture plantations, dams, and 
 mines don’t fight climate change, they significantly accelerate it” (Paley, 2010, 
 2).  
  
 In additions to major criticism over the ineffective nature of the UN and 
international responses, concern has also been voiced over several more specific areas of 
climate change responses. Two of the most well known mechanisms for attempting to 
combat both further climate changes and assist those dealing with the changes are 
adaptations and mitigation. On the surface both of these mechanisms seems like viable 
solutions to both curbing and adapting to climate change. Yet criticism is often voiced 
not over the fundamental ideas of these two methods but over their implementation and 
ineffective nature. First, it is cited that, many times funding and resources are unfairly 
distributed and that more funding is directed towards reducing emissions and mitigation 
and far less is allocated for reducing the effects of climate change and adaptations. The 
unfortunate result of this funding imbalance is that developed countries are seeing more 
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funding than developing countries that need the help in a far more urgent way (Morales, 
2010, 1).  
 Recently in 2009, Oxfam International produced an extensive study on adaptation 
mechanisms that highlighted many of the downfalls and provided a concise summary of 
the many frustrations that are felt over climate change resources and funding. Generally, 
the report found that current aid falls far short of what is required (Pettengell, 2010, 11). 
“The result is high costs for developing countries, low transparency, poor accountability 
of donor governments, no national ownership, and a woefully inadequate level of funding 
reaching projects on the ground” (Pettengell, 2010, 11). The critique is based on the fact 
that the aid strategies for adaptation are based on an existing international aid structure 
that is already inadequate and inappropriate. The report further sights three main 
problems with the delivery of adaptation aid. First, the aid is given through what they call 
a “spaghetti bowl” of funding channels that creates confusion and high transaction costs 
for the recipients. Secondly, the aid is not demand based, meaning that much of the aid is 
directed not to those most in need but to areas that donor countries choose, which leaves 
gaps in some places and over funding in others. Lastly, and most troubling is the 
underfunding and empty pledges by donor countries. To complicate the lack of 
commitment, when funding is available, cumbersome procedures create further hurdles to 
accessing the funds (Pettengell, 2010, 11-13). In short, the bureaucracy that surrounds 
adaptation and mitigation make a potentially viable solution frustrating and insufficient.  
 The concept of technology transfers from wealthy and more scientifically advanced 
nations to those attempting to adapt to climate change has also come under some 
scrutiny, especially by those countries in desperate need of the advances. Again, like the 
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ideas of adaptation and mitigation, it is not the technology transfer or the science itself 
that has come under attack, but the way in which it is accessed and distributed. Many 
technologies related to dealing with the effects of climate change are in fact under private 
domain and are often patented by corporations. This system blocks the free flow of 
innovation and technology vital to adaptation and mitigation from getting to those who 
need it most. The technologies that are patented additionally come with a price for their 
use that make them more expensive for developing countries that are often financially 
unstable and can create an inability for the technology to be obtained (Morales, 2010, 2). 
These obstacles put in place by developed countries simply serve to enforce a market 
based approach to adaptation and mitigation, impede effectiveness and add another place 
where funding must be diverted.  
 Possibly the most controversial of all of international solutions to curbing GHG’s 
and alleviating climate change is the REDD program. Critics of the program, largely 
comprised of indigenous communities and their supporters, cite several reasons that the 
REDD program, as currently defined, is problematic. First, there is the inherent weakness 
of the definition a “forest” is under the REDD program. As it stands now, the definition 
of a forest includes not just naturally preserved forests that have remained intact in the 
face of massive deforestation over the last several centuries, but also industrial tree 
plantations that have been planted where natural forests no longer exist. According to 
numerous NGO groups, the consideration of these spaces as actual forests is and 
“egregious error…Plantations are not forests. Forests are diverse ecosystems and 
plantations are void of biodiversity. The UN definition endangers Indigenous Peoples,  
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forest dependent people, peasants, small farmers, biodiversity and exacerbates climate 
change” (Global Justice Equality Project, 2008, 1).  
 According to The Global Canopy Program, future aims for REDD mechanisms 
include the conservation of biodiversity (Parker, 2009, 12). Yet, by allowing, and then 
rewarding governments to replace deforested areas with agricultural tree crops instead of 
ensuring the regeneration and protection of forest ecosystems, the UN is facilitating a 
great disservice to biodiversity. Although planting tree farms in deforested areas would 
technically deliver some positive impacts on emissions by serving as man made carbon 
sinks, they only provide a short term and an unsustainable answer to deforestation and 
emissions capturing. Tree farms promote monoculture trees as a commodity, a process 
that increases pesticide use, can be detrimental for soil health and can harm water runoff. 
Through REDD, the international community should seize opportunities to improve 
biodiversity by enforcing more strict deforestation policies and reforesting areas to curb 
emission. Such policies would, by extension, support forest dwelling and indigenous 
peoples and their livelihoods. The goals of REDD should aim to create long-term 
strategies and sustainable solutions that would promote this while steering clear of 
commodity driven schemes that further harm biodiversity and ecosystems.   
 Furthermore, there is great concern within indigenous and forest dependent peoples 
that REDD will infringe upon indigenous land rights and human rights conditions in 
forest regions. Tom Goldtooth, director of the Indigenous Environment Network in the 
United States has voiced opposition to the REDD project. He and his organization oppose 
the project because it lacks guarantees for respecting indigenous lands and because the 
communities that are involved can end up renting their traditional lands and renouncing 
  73 
their own property (Chavez, 2010, 1). Native peoples fear that they will inevitably lose 
what little land they have and that they will not benefit from UN rewards through REDD 
even though they have protected the forests effectively for centuries. Camila Moreno of 
Friends of the Earth has gone so far as to speculate that “the system of credits was created 
to permit the entry of international agencies and to monitor people’s lives, and then to 
create a financial mechanism for negotiating rights with speculative ends” (Chavez, 2010, 
1).  
 Unfortunately, last years events at the COP 15 in Copenhagen did little to assuage 
the fears for those skeptical of REDD. In fact, the summit actually weakened the 
language of REDD and left both existing forests and indigenous peoples vulnerable after 
the Copenhagen Accord. NGO’s that attended the summit criticized it for removing key 
protections for rainforests and downgrading language that was meant to support and 
protect local forest communities (McDonald, 2009, 1). In the draft text of the accord that 
was agreed upon after three days of closed-door discussions, the objective for reducing 
deforestation by at least 50% by 2020 that had been included in an earlier pre-
Copenhagen draft of the REDD document had been totally removed (McDonald, 2009, 
1).  The Copenhagen Accord also lacks a plan for funding the REDD program, aside 
from a handful of short term funding arrangements. Also, safeguards that protected 
biodiversity and indigenous rights had been greatly weakened by being moved to a non-
binding section of the Copenhagen text.  
 According to Accra Caucus, a group of over 100 NGO’s in more than thirty 
countries, the overall objective of REDD is to halt deforestation and should include the 
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following: a target for ending deforestation by 2020, protection of intact natural forests 
and their biodiversity, support of restoration of degraded natural forests, recognition that 
plantations are not forests and should be excluded, action against the real drivers of 
deforestation, no benefits to large scale industrial activities like logging, cattle ranching 
and agro-fuel production, policies and measures against demand side drivers of 
deforestation, including trade agreements, and assurance that they do not contradict or 
undermine the goal of halting deforestation and degradation (Lang, 2010, 1).Without 
these types of measures it is feared REDD will fall short of protecting forest and curbing 
climate change.  
4. The Alternative Climate Summit and Alternative Solutions 
 With mounting opposition to the solutions offered at the international level, 
concerned parties have begun to rightfully ask what alternative solutions could be 
presented and how they would be most effectively implemented. After all, it seems 
fruitless to openly, and at time scathingly criticize the efforts of the UN and other 
international and state bodies without actively contributing to the climate crisis dialogue. 
In order for criticism and alternative solutions to appear credible and convincing the 
skeptical groups must create viable options for alternative change. In an attempt to create 
an atmosphere of open debate and dialogue that could facilitate such ideas, as well as put 
change into motion, The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights 
of Mother Earth was held in Cochabamba, Bolivia over three days in April of 2010. In 
response to the lack of access that many NGO’s and other interested parties received 
during Copenhagen COP 15 in December, Bolivian President Evo Morales proposed 
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hosting the conference as a forum for those left frustrated and disappointed by the lack of 
a binding agreement after Copenhagen. And so it was with this effort that environmental, 
climate justice, indigenous rights and human rights groups, as well as other varying 
participants from 150 different countries joined government representatives and several 
heads of state for the event (Eshelman, 2010, 1).  
 The goals of the conference were multifaceted and included analyzing the 
structural causes of climate change, proposing alternative models for living harmoniously 
in nature and dealing with the climate crisis, drawing up a Universal Declaration for the 
Rights of Mother Earth, building a mechanisms that would provide an international 
referendum on climate change, and developing a proposal for an international Climate 
Justice Court (Eshelman, 2010, 1). A system of seventeen working groups was devised to 
divide the summit into manageable sections that ranged from deforestation issues to 
appropriate technology transfers to climate migrant issues.  The working groups 
convened every day for discussions with the goal of eventually providing a statement of 
intent that would inform the final Mother Earth Rights document. The conference also 
boasted prominent environmental and social justice figures who held panel discussions, 
classes and debates that addressed hundreds for topics. Crucially, the conference argued 
one overarching point, that the conversation about climate change and the strategies to 
deal with it needed to be broadened and not narrowed and that traditionally marginalized 
voices must be included in a vital dialogue that should include each and every human 
affected by the climate crisis (Eshelman, 2010, 2). 
 The outcomes of this conference of peoples from all over the globe should not be 
understated. First, it was the first conference of its kind to join activist and other 
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concerned parties from all over the world. It created a forum for both people of power 
and average citizens to express their views on the problems and solutions of climate 
change. Further, the creation of the final document, commonly referred to a the “Peoples 
Agreement,” articulated for the first time in one place, the goals and aspirations of a 
movement for alternative solutions to the climate crisis. The document, unique in itself, 
addresses climate change through a different lens than is commonly used within the 
international arena. It looks at climate change not just as a problem limited to a rise in 
global temperatures, but ventures to question the structural causes behind the acceleration 
of climate change. Highly critical of the ways in which capitalism have influenced and 
shaped global and international policies, the Peoples Agreement states: 
 “The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and 
 limitless growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without 
 limits, separating human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination 
 upon nature, transforming everything into commodities”(Peoples Agreement, 
 2010, 1).  
Conference attendees examined the nature of an economic system that has fueled 
anthropogenic climate change and the incompatibility of this system with the ending of 
the climate crisis.  
 The solutions offered by the Peoples Agreement are numerous and begin with 
suggestions for the strengthening of international apparatuses that deal with the 
environment and indigenous rights. First, the agreement calls for the complete 
recognition of the UNDRIP as a whole and pushes for universal recognition of the 
document. If countries were able to follow the regulations set forth in the UNDRIP, many 
of the environmental rights violations against indigenous peoples would be ended. The 
agreement also calls for the creation of an International Climate and Environmental 
  77 
Justice Tribunal that would have actual binding and legal capacity to prevent, judge and 
penalized states, industries and individual persons that blatantly and without regard 
provoke climate change. It is also suggested that supporting states would be willing to 
bring claims to the tribunal that would indict nations who have not complied with 
commitments under the UNFCCC and under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their impact of 
GHG’s into the atmosphere (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 7). This section of the document 
is calling for some form of binding commitment similar to what was promised but not 
achieved through the COP 15. In the establishment of a body that would actually have 
legal power, victims of climate change would have a forum in which to bring grievances 
and States and industries would feel far more compelled to comply with laws, 
commitments and regulations in the fear of actually being held accountable for their 
failures.  
 The concepts and theories of climate debt to facilitate solutions that are both 
ethical and productive were discussed at length during the alternative summit. There was 
a specific working group that dealt with the issue of climate debt and repayment for 
historical abuses by developed and industrialized nations. The summit was largely in 
support of beginning a system of climate debt repayments that would largely go towards 
both adaptation and mitigation funding in developing countries. Further, the Peoples 
Agreement found fault with current funding models that are being directed toward 
development for climate change solutions. In addition to Official Development 
Assistance and public sources, the agreement calls for new annual commitments of at 
least 6% of developed countries GDP’s to tackle climate change. This is much more than 
any country is currently giving annually but many developed countries spend similar 
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amounts on national defense every year and recently have spend billions on corporate and 
banking bailouts (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 1). In keeping with climate debt ideals, this 
money would be free of conditions and would not interfere with national sovereignty or 
the self-determination of the most vulnerable and affected groups.  
 In sum, the summit supported the assessment and eventual payment of climate 
debts as well as a rethinking of national spending by developed countries. With a 
reprioritization of monetary spending the financial backing needed to both adapt to and 
mitigate climate change could be achieved. On top of any climate repayment schemes 
that would be put into place, the Peoples Agreement calls for the construction of an 
Adaptation Fund “that exclusively addresses climate change as part of a financial 
mechanism that is managed in a sovereign, transparent, and equitable manner for all 
States” (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 4). This fund would assess the impacts of climate 
change on developing countries and would also include some kind of mechanism for 
compensation due to current and future damages, loss of opportunities due to climate 
change and any additional costs that present themselves (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 4). 
 In addition to stronger international regulations and more effective funding 
channels for those in need, the agreement focuses on the importance of both technology 
and of forested regions. First, the document does not support the idea of “technology 
showcases” that have been proposed by developed countries under the UN, which would 
market technological advances to peoples in developing areas. This method would 
demand that states already struggling financially to deal with climate change would have 
to then pay for the technologies that might be able to alleviate climate pressure and save 
lives. Instead the document supports the “establishment for guidelines in order to create a 
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multilateral and multidisciplinary mechanism for participatory control, management, and 
evaluation of the exchange of technologies” and that “these technologies must be useful, 
clean and socially sound” (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 7). Likewise, it supports a fund to 
finance the invention of technologies that are appropriate and free of intellectual property 
rights. With these commitments the sharing of solutions would be encouraged and 
valuable funding would be directed in other more fruitful directions.  
 In the wake of much controversy over REDD policy, the agreement also 
addressed what should be done about forest areas around the world. The view that 
prevailed at the summit was that polluting countries should have the obligation to carry 
out direct transfers of both economic and technological resources that are and will be 
needed to pay for the restoration and maintenance of forests and support the livelihoods 
of indigenous and other native forest stewards (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 5). This 
funding should again be direct and outside of the establishment of carbon markets and 
should not serve as carbon offsets. The summit also supported countries abandoning 
REDD stewardship methods in exchange for the development of programs that would 
create the restoration of forests and jungles through native management and 
implementation of seeds, fruit and native flora, not tree plantations (Peoples Agreement, 
2010, 5).  
 There was also a working group that focused on the issue of environmentally 
induced migration and the effects of climate change on the movement of displaced 
peoples both within their home countries and abroad. Environmental degradation and 
climate change have created an entirely new category of people who are being forced to 
relocate themselves either temporarily or permanently. According to projections there 
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were already about twenty-five million climate migrants in 1995. Presently, estimates put 
the population at approximately double that. Looking to the future, estimates range 
anywhere from two hundred million to one billion people who will be displaced due to 
environmental factors by 2050 (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 6). This massive problem 
obviously needs to be addressed and the summit provided two different steps that should 
be taken in order to aid and protect these increasingly vulnerable populations. First, 
developed countries should consider assuming responsibility for climate migrants, 
accepting them into their territories as environmental refugees and recognizing their 
fundamental human rights that are protected by existing international conventions. 
Further, the document supports the creation of an International Tribunal of Conscience 
that would denounce, make visible, document, judge and punish violations of the rights 
of migrants, refugees and displaced persons within the countries of origin, transit or 
destination. This mechanism would clearly identify the responsibilities of states, 
companies and other actors (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 6).  
 One of the most frequently discussed topics both at the summit and within the 
subsequent document was the importance of recovering indigenous knowledge to support 
new ways of living in nature that would reduce human impacts on the planet. The 
approach of revitalizing and following indigenous traditions would have two positive 
outcomes. First, it would support ways of life that are currently in danger of disappearing 
in a rapidly globalizing world. And second, indigenous traditions would encourage living 
closer to the land, lowering our anthropogenic impact and hopefully reduce the rapidity in 
which climate change is occurring. According to the text, “the world must recover and re-
learn ancestral principles and approaches from native peoples to stop the destruction of 
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the planet, as well as promote ancestral practices, knowledge and spirituality to 
recuperate the capacity for “living well” in harmony with Mother Earth” (Peoples 
Agreement, 2010, 7).  
 A good example of an area where indigenous and ancestral practices would create 
significant changes that would be positive for the environment would be through 
agriculture. Currently, the majority of the worlds food supply is manufactured by large 
agribusiness, with the goal of producing food not for nutritional purposes, but to fulfill 
market expectations and serves as one of the biggest contributors to global climate 
change (People Agreement, 2010, 5). In order to reduce GHG emissions and support a 
healthier and more local food supply, the international community should support a 
profound shift in agricultural practices, supporting the sustainable models of production 
that have been used by indigenous peoples all over the globe for centuries. This would 
also extend to support populations having control over their own seeds, lands, water and 
food production and would bolster food sovereignty (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 4). In 
addition, states should give legal recognition to claims over territories, lands and natural 
resources that will enable traditional ways of life to flourish and contribute to dealing 
with the climate change dilemma. Finally, indigenous peoples specifically should be 
offered full consultation, participation and prior consent in all negotiation processes 
related to measure of climate change policy, especially when those measures involve 
indigenous territories or resources (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 6). This consultation 
would allow the flow of indigenous knowledge of the natural environment to reach the  
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international level, especially to the UN, and would positively inform climate policy 
decisions.  
 Finally, and possibly the most interesting of the alternative suggestion developed 
at the summit was in support of a global referendum on climate change issues. The 
summit and the Peoples Agreement stemmed from a belief that the crisis that faces the 
world due to global climate change affects every living human being and is therefore 
something that all people should be engaged in. The decisions made about policy 
solutions concern all people and a global referendum would allow everyone to weigh in 
on the issues. The referendum would address the following issues; “the level of emission 
reductions on the part of developed countries and transnational corporations, financing to 
be offered by developed countries, the creation of an International Climate Justice 
Tribunal, the need for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, and the 
need to change the current capitalist system” (Peoples Agreement, 2010, 7). Though 
billions of people around the globe are concerned with providing food, water and shelter 
to their families and have little time for politics or other international affairs on a daily 
basis, they are the populations most affected by climate change and have acute 
knowledge of the ways in which those changes are effecting their most vital of resources. 
Therefore, it seems only logical that the international community find some way, no 
matter how daunting the task, to include their voices in the dialogue over climate change 
and climate change policy.  
 Much like the UDHR, the Peoples Agreement is aspirational. It offers alternative 
solutions in the understanding that the suggestions made aim infinitely high and may 
never be fully accomplished. Yet, the hope of those who attended the Peoples Climate 
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Summit is that those attending the COP 16 in Mexico in 2010 will take the adoption of 
this document or something similar into consideration. It is also hoped that the developed 
countries listed in Annex 1 begin to respect the existing legal frameworks they have 
signed onto and reduce their GHG emissions, as well as that the different proposals 
contained in the Peoples Agreement will be adopted through existing international bodies 






1. Summary of Major Findings 
 There are several overarching and pivotal findings that have become apparent 
through the research conducted for this thesis. First and foremost, it has become 
exceedingly clear that global climate change acutely affects poor, historically and 
structurally marginalized populations with different and more extreme impacts than other 
populations. Conversely, developed and exceedingly industrialized developing nations 
are disproportionately contributing to the acceleration of climate change. The poor and 
marginalized groups include indigenous peoples around the world, with a diverse 
segment situated in Latin America. The region was an interesting case study of the effects 
of climate change on indigenous peoples because it is so geographically and culturally 
varied. With hundreds of different indigenous groups living in the region, their 
experiences and struggles are diverse and complex. Yet, many groups share common 
histories, similar belief systems and analogous local political and social structures that 
create commonalities. Indigenous groups in Latin America have struggled with an 
oppressive colonial past that has left them impoverished, deprived of political power and 
ill-equipped to deal with the negative political, economic and social effects of climate 
change. These effects include warming temperatures, decreased precipitation, rising sea 
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levels and more severe weather phenomena. These effects have contributed to existing 
hardships in the region and have profoundly affected many aspects of life for indigenous 
communities.  
 In this context, the issues of climate change and their disproportionate effects on 
indigenous and other marginalized populations should be addressed as a human rights 
violation. The UDHR, Article 25:1 states, 
 Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
 being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
 care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
 unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
 livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (UN, 1948, 
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml) 
 
Though there are many rights guaranteed in the UDHR that indigenous peoples have 
almost always lacked (ie: medical care, social services), this passage is especially 
important because of the reference to ‘circumstances beyond his control’. Indigenous 
peoples are acutely suffering from ‘a lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond their 
control’ due to climate change perpetuated by outside forces. This research has 
expounded upon the fact that indigenous peoples have an exceptionally minimal effect on 
the processes that lead to drastic climate change. Yet, developed and industrialized 
nations have historically and continue presently to exacerbate climate change and, by 
extension, negatively affect the livelihood circumstances of other groups. The 
infringement of rich and privileged societies on the rights of indigenous peoples through 
the continuation of irresponsible environmental actions is a moral issue. It is ethically 
objectionable that certain groups continue to reap the benefits of these actions while 
others are unable to attain the most basic level of human rights. Many of the principal 
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contributors to climate change are unwilling to frame the issue in ethical terms. 
Therefore, as in times past, the human rights community must find ways to frame it as a 
moral concern. In order to draw attention to the inequities and injustices of climate 
change, stronger focus should be placed on the infringement of climate change on basic 
human rights.   
 Secondly, this research has illuminated the specific crisis of resource allocation 
and distribution that climate change has caused for indigenous peoples in Latin America. 
Indigenous peoples are found throughout the region, mainly living subsistence 
livelihoods, where they grow their own food, maintain water supplies and govern their 
own land use policies (though sometimes one or all of these is interfered with by state 
actors). Most communities live close to the land and have maintained the same systems 
and practices for generations. Yet now, climate change has created unpredictable and 
unreliable weather patterns and other complications that are interfering with traditional 
practices. Many indigenous populations are struggling to maintain agricultural yields, 
collect water for drinking and irrigation or preserve healthy land and soil. Climate change 
has increased the risk that once thriving and healthy communities will be forced to leave 
their lands. In some cases, entire communities have been lost. Indigenous peoples in the 
region have an intense connection to their land, the food it produces and the water that 
sustains it. For many, resources define identities while simultaneously sustaining 
livelihoods, making resource allocation paramount to indigenous cultures. The threat to 
these resources from climate change is therefore a stark reality in Latin America. 
 Lastly, this research has established that, while action is being taken at the 
international level to deal with climate change, the system is greatly flawed and has fallen 
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short of providing the mitigation needed to curb climate change and adapt to its worst 
effects. The UN, developed nation states and other international actors have favored a 
plethora of market-based solutions to both mitigate and adapt to climate change. Relying 
almost entirely on these types of solutions can be viewed as problematic for several 
reasons.  First, heavily favoring market-based solutions to climate change issues employs 
the same market models that have led to climatic pressures. Anthropogenic climate 
change has been fueled largely by industries and nations that promote consumptive 
practices, the reliance on global marketplaces and industrialization. If market-based 
policy initiatives had proven effective at curbing emissions and slowing climatic change 
in the last two decades, this might seem less problematic. But this research has shown 
that these policy choices have not created the change needed and presumably will 
continue to be unsuccessful as long as actors do not feel compelled to comply with 
internationally set goals and standards. It would seem more effective to look, at least in 
part, for solutions outside of such markets that would less likely be dictated by or rely on 
powerful state and corporate actors. In future research, I would like to explore 
international frameworks to see what, if any, effective apparatuses exist or are being 
promoted at the international level for incentivizing responsible emissions reductions 
outside of market-based programs.  
 Also, market-based solutions often alienate indigenous and other marginalized 
communities. Many times these communities have little access to global markets, making 
participation in them difficult. Aside from a lack of access, some indigenous communities 
wish to remain separate from national and international markets and institutions that have 
served to disenfranchise their communities and harm their environments in the past. 
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Industrialized and developed nations hold the onus for most of the planets climatic 
changes, and it is those groups who should consider making larger economic sacrifices 
than they are at present. This would include changing habitual market-based tendencies 
and yielding to alternative solutions that would be more inclusive of indigenous peoples, 
more quickly curbing emissions.  
 Solutions like cap and trade programs and REDD cannot realistically be 
abandoned due to their entrenchment within international climate change frameworks and 
their popularity among powerful actors who need to be fully involved with the 
international climate change agenda. Yet this should not mean that ideas for alternative 
solutions that could add to the equitability and effectiveness of climate change strategies 
should not also be considered. The UN often struggles to mandate practices that achieve 
the goals set forth within their policies. This is often due to a lack of authority at the UN 
level and also to the historical uncooperative nature of powerful entities, specifically the 
US. Yet, if pressure from civil society and the grassroots international community was 
recognized by the UN and then articulated to important and powerful international actors, 
there would be a chance that demands from below could change the actions of those with 
power and influence. Strong and continuous civil disapproval, brought forth through the 
UN, could be a catalyst for developed nations and corporations to be compelled to change 
their standards and practices in order to curb emissions and to meet agreed upon goals.  
 In addition to exclusionary and weak solutions through international channels, the 
UN climate programs struggle with transparency issues, a lack of funding and 
international commitment, painfully slow and cumbersome decision making processes 
and a lack of overall legitimacy and normative strength that bog down the system. The 
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UN struggles on all fronts with creating policy decisions in a timely fashion and is 
constantly battling the enduring uncooperativeness of the US. Unfortunately, climate 
change is an issue that the international community needed to have effective solutions for 
years ago. This crisis is revealing itself as one that will be increasingly difficult to attack. 
In reaction to stagnation at the international level, this research has also found a 
burgeoning movement to create alternative solutions to climate change issues. These 
solutions are both local and international in scope. They come from a grassroots 
movement that seeks to have both their complaints and suggestions heard by the UN and 
developed nations. Because the globalized international community plays such a large 
role in fueling climate change, as well as in setting climate change policy, it is unrealistic 
to think this grassroots movement can, at this point, bypass international actors to solve 
climate problems. But alternative solutions, including those from indigenous populations, 
could be given a larger role in climate discourse in order to create a more robust and 
well-rounded conversation that would include varied knowledge, ideas and narratives. 
This would, perhaps, provide a multifaceted set of solutions that would address climate 
change more effectively than at present, possibly combining solutions from both market-
based and non-market-based perspectives.  
2. Discussion 
 First, I believe that many benefits would arise from a meaningful and cooperative 
relationship between indigenous groups and international bodies like the UN. Though 
some recognition has been paid to indigenous peoples, the international community, 
especially the UN, could do far more to incorporate indigenous peoples into international 
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climate change policy and discourse. Through unique perspectives and livelihood models, 
indigenous peoples could supply alternative viewpoints and knowledge that would help 
to broaden international climate change dialogue. The openness to include these 
perspectives, and especially environmental knowledge, would do several things. First, 
more indigenous representation would hopefully provide a balance between market-based 
solutions and alternative narratives being promoted at the grassroots level. Also, 
indigenous community members would bring first hand experience about the struggles 
and misfortunes that climate change has created, along with the experiences of adapting 
to them in their daily lives. These experiences could provide insight into alternatives, or 
at the very least provide more balance among opinions. In addition, promotion of 
indigenous knowledge could have a positive effect on international science and policy 
work as a whole.  
 The in-depth and valuable knowledge of weather, ecosystems and the natural 
world that indigenous peoples have could be invaluable to both scientists and policy 
makers, bringing forth knowledge and experience that could benefit climate solutions. 
Policy on climate change at the UN level is inextricably linked to the work of UN 
scientist who spend months, years, and even decades in the field all over the globe 
documenting climate phenomena in order to explain climate change. Policy is supported 
or refuted with this valuable scientific knowledge and is vitally important to international 
level choices that are impactful on mitigation and adaptation. But even the best western  
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scientists have shortcomings and could benefit from indigenous traditional 
understandings.  
 Scientist Shari Gearheard, a geographer and a researcher at the National Snow 
and Ice Data Center in Boulder, Colorado, has worked in the Canadian Arctic alongside 
the Inuit indigenous peoples for fifteen years. She has become a member of the Clyde 
River community in Nunavut, Canada and has fostered strong personal and professional 
relationships with the Clyde River population. In her scientific work she has found that 
native hunters, fisherman and village elders are keen observers of weather and ice 
patterns and have much knowledge that is useful to herself and other scientific 
researchers (Grossman, 2009, 
http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/blogs/news/chiefeditor/2009/12/using-indigenous-
knowledge-for.html). She claims the Inuit are peripatetic travelers, even in harsh weather, 
logging in their heads observations on a much finer scale than most western scientists. 
The indigenous peoples sometimes have noticed weather and ice patterns that scientists 
have not even thought to study. An interesting example of this was when Inuit hunters 
she interviewed brought up their concern for seals sinking rather than floating in the 
seawater after they were speared for food. This seemed an odd observation but Gearheard 
soon realized that the hunters had unexpectedly discovered the changing salinity in the 
water, caused by an influx of freshwater from melting glaciers. The less salty water could 




 It is examples like this that show the value of collaboration between western 
science and indigenous observational knowledge. In turn, the science and study of global 
climate change is of paramount importance to policymakers, influencing choices at the 
UN level. Through greater scientific collaboration with indigenous communities, the UN 
could increase its cooperation between local level communities and recognize the 
importance of indigenous voices in the processes of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Indigenous hunters and elders around the globe have similar knowledge that, 
if discovered and utilized by scientists like Gearheard, could be of immense help for UN 
scientists and could influence policy. Though these experiences may seem small, they 
could have great contributive effects on the depth of environmental understanding and 
climate change science.  
 The international community has also made commitments to the human and 
indigenous rights of these communities and has often fallen far short of protecting them. 
By opening a more extensive dialogue with these marginalized and struggling 
communities, international bodies would come closer to respecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples, while amplifying their voices in policy and decision making. Current 
actions to confront the issues of climate change are failing and the international 
community would benefit from new perspectives and ideas that have not yet been 
explored. I believe that indigenous perspectives could positively inform the direction in 
which climate change negotiations should move. Further, a more comprehensive 
inclusion of indigenous knowledge and attempts to include alternative solutions could 
have the potential to satisfy detractors of current UN policies and could possibly bring 
more people from the international grassroots movement on board with UN proposals.  
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 In addition to allowing a larger role for indigenous peoples in international 
climate discourse, this research has impressed upon me the crucial importance of 
indigenous knowledge as a whole for climate change science, policy and discourse. 
Traditional knowledge bases not only have deep and intrinsic value in and of themselves, 
but also could have a profound impact on the solutions for climate change on both a local 
and international level. Though this research has focused on communities solely in Latin 
America, native communities around the world have an amazing amount of knowledge 
and understanding to offer that could be implemented. Indigenous communities tend to 
live closely tied to the land on which they live, relying on traditional knowledge to 
sustain successful rural livelihoods. In an increasingly globalized and industrialized 
world, billions of people live in cities where food is bought in stores, water comes from a 
faucet and our interaction with nature is generally limited to recreation. Many of our lives 
are isolated from nature, with no understanding of how our food is grown, how our 
resources are obtained or how we affect our ecosystems. With this reality, great benefit 
could come from allowing both our daily lives and our responses to climate change to be 
influenced and informed by those who live more closely to the natural world. 
 As evident in the above example of indigenous Inuit knowledge on scientists 
working in the arctic, indigenous knowledge is based on generations of understanding 
shared between family members and communities. It utilizes acute senses of observation 
and traditions of strong oral history and collective memory. This knowledge is 
intrinsically valuable, but can also provide important historical insight. Indigenous 
peoples are not only valuable to inform science but to aid in the conservation and 
preservation of ecosystem maintenance and biological diversity. Through the UN and a 
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multitude of civil society actor groups, the global community has increasingly recognized 
the importance of biodiversity and the value of cultural diversity. It is at the intersection 
of these two principles that a third emerges, biocultural diversity, which provides an 
illustrative example of the importance of indigenous knowledge for both biological 
diversity and, by extension, climate change. 
 Biocultural diversity is the diversity of life in all of its forms, biological, cultural 
and even linguistic. Recent research has shown that places around the global with the 
most biological diversity also happen to be the places that enjoy the most cultural and 
linguistic diversity. Over 95% of the world’s high-biodiversity areas overlap 
geographically with lands claimed by culturally diverse and indigenous peoples (Alcorn, 
2008, 44). By physically mapping both biological and cultural diversity, their overlap is 
apparent, especially near the equator where both biology and culture are especially thick. 
The overlap that exists is important to recognize, of course, for the obvious positive 
impact diverse indigenous cultures have on the biological diversity. But it can also be 
seen in connection with climate change issues. There are several reasons for the 
international community to pay attention to this intersection of indigenous communities 
and biological diversity in the face of climate change: first they are effective at 
safeguarding the environment, avoiding or mitigating climate impacts by enduring the 
continued protection of ecosystems. The Surui peoples of Brazil are an example of this. 
Also, they have potential adaptive powers, providing corridors for ecosystems and 
species migration that will inevitably occur as a result of changing climatic conditions. 
And more intrinsically, their communities and cultures contain the basis for resilience 
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that communities around the world will need in order to deal with climate change 
(Kothari, 2008, 37). 
 This research focused significantly on the importance of resources and has made 
clear the fact that resource obtainment is critically challenged by climate change. In light 
of this, I support the incorporation of indigenous resource management practices, at least 
in part, at both local and international levels. Fundamentally, resources are being 
dramatically affected by climate change and in turn, indigenous communities are being 
affected by resource problems. Yet, it must also be noted that many of the resource 
allocation strategies propagated by the globalized world directly contribute to the 
acceleration of climate change. So the resource problem exists in both directions. This is 
illustrated most poignantly by the predominant methods of food production throughout 
the industrialized world, which are done through large agribusiness and are taxing on the 
environment in a number of ways.  
 Industrialized farming utilizes intensive pesticide use, which can have damaging 
effects on entire ecosystems, including human populations. These huge agricultural 
manufacturers use monoculture planting practices that are hard on land and are harmful 
to soil health and productivity. Additionally, these practices are extremely water 
intensive, often requiring massive amounts for dry and arid soil with little nutrients 
remaining. Moreover, many large agribusiness crops are shipped far distances, adding to 
carbon outputs and impacting GHG emissions. Unfortunately, the current ways in which 
the world produces most of its food are some of the largest detriments to our planet and 
directly contribute to further climate change.  
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 Conversely, small-scale farming, including that of many indigenous communities, 
relies on sustainable agriculture that is far less impactful on land, water resources and the 
environment. Generally implementing a diverse set of crops, utilizing crop rotation, 
applying fewer chemicals and relying on local irrigation systems, small-scale farming has 
fewer implications for the environment and surrounding ecosystems. They also create far 
fewer climate change impacts. These practices have many positive effects including 
supporting local markets, creating social cohesion, producing seed and crop varieties and 
preserving healthy soil composition through crop rotation. Small-scale farming by 
indigenous communities is done for both subsistence livelihoods and for domestic and 
even international agricultural markets. Though the entire worlds population could not, at 
this point, survive on small-scale agricultural production alone, it seems important to seek 
to incorporate these less harmful and more sustainable practices into the global food 
system. At the agribusiness level, it would be beneficial to employ more organic 
methods, crop rotation and diversified crops. These methods are often shunned because 
they are not as cost effective for big agribusinesses, but in the long run they would stand 
to improve soil quality, ecosystem health and reduce overall GHG emissions.  
 Small-scale practices and indigenous knowledge would be even more applicable 
on the growing phenomenon of urban agriculture. Much of the world’s population lives 
in highly populated cities and urban centers. Urban dwellers have become accustomed to 
produce, meat and dairy products coming from locations far from the city, or from across 
the world. Yet in order to reduce GHG emissions, urban areas could attempt to, at least in 
part, localize their food supplies. The practices and knowledge of rural indigenous 
farmers could potentially provide educational materials for both urban gardeners and 
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small-scale producers outside of city centers on how to conserve water, manage pests and 
produce larger yields, among other small-scale farming techniques. Sharing knowledge 
about agriculture and other resource management issues could be one way for the UN to 
incorporate indigenous peoples into climate discourse and promote GHG reductions in 
cities across the world. This too, would illustrate a very positive side of the globalized 
international community where indigenous peoples could share valuable agricultural and 
environment insight with other groups that would benefit from their wealth of 
experiences.  
 In conclusion, this research has been vital in my understanding of both the region 
of Latin America and the indigenous peoples who live there. My comprehension of the 
grave realities of climate change on the population is now more robust and I found a 
human rights framework for indigenous and climate change issues extremely helpful. 
Overall, I support the further inclusion of indigenous peoples and their narratives at the 
international level, especially within the UN, to both improve climate change policies and 
the status of indigenous peoples. I recognize now more than ever the importance of 
indigenous traditional knowledge in all facets of climate change science and policy and 
its importance for the development of creative alternative solutions. Finally, I encourage 
the use, at least in part, of indigenous systems of resource distribution, especially within 
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